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Only twenty years ago the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) declined
to extend its regulatory powers to the cable television industry, asserting that cable
provided no threat to television broadcasting. By 1966, however, this new industry
had grown to the point where the Commission began to restrict cable growth in the
largest metropolitan areas of the country, arguing that otherwise the development
of cable would seriously threaten the viability of the over-the-air television system.
Over the next six years, the Commission drafted a complex series of rules for cable
operations, limiting distant signal carriage, restricting pay television offerings,
requiring program originations, mandating minimum channel capacity, and imposing
a variety of technical and administrative standards. Now, only eight years later,
many of these rules have been abandoned by the Commission or overturned by the
courts, and the FCC is considering a proposal to eliminate virtually all of the
remaining provisions of the rules. In just twenty years, the Commission has thus
come almost full circle, from advocating no regulation to imposing highly restrictive
regulations, and finally to proposing the elimination of all cable regulation once
again. In a world in which regulatory commissions and policies last for decades
(and even for a century in some cases), such rapid change is novel if not unique.
The cable television industry provides an interesting case study of regulation
for several reasons. First, like trucking or intrastate natural gas, the cable television
industry developed as a substitute for a regulated service. Television broadcasting
had been regulated by the FCC for some time when cable television operators
began to offer retransmissions of distant broadcast signals. It is not surprising that
this new industry was soon viewed as a threat to the established, regulated
television industry. Extension of regulation of the new challenger was a natural
response for the regulators.
Second, cable television offers a classic example of how markets operate to
thwart regulators' attempts to cross subsidize "meritorious" services. The FCC has
limited the number of television outlets in each major market and required that
part of the profits generated as a result be devoted to "public service" programming,
i.e., nonremunerative local, news, and public affairs programs. Cable television, a
new distribution technology capable of adding immensely to the number of signals
available in a market, by increasing the competition broadcasters face, can reduce
local broadcasters' ability to offer these merit programs. Perceiving a threat to its
policy of cross-subsidization, the Commission could be expected to attempt to limit
competition.
Third, cable television provides an excellent example of how difficult it is to
restrict entry when technology is changing rapidly. Just as the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) has seen its ability to regulate railroads compromised by the
invention of the truck and then the airplane, the FCC has found it difficult to
continue to protect its television broadcast licensees from the onslaught of technology.
While it was possible to regulate cable television as a new medium, as we will argue,
further developments in technology have made it extremely difficult for the
Commission to continue to constrain cable growth. If technological change is
sufficiently rapid, deregulation may be unavoidable in almost any sector.
Fourth, the case of cable television regulation demonstrates how difficult it is to
make a sustainable and convincing case for protecting the public from competition.
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Virtually all of the premises upon which the Commission regulated cable television
have been shown to be invalid. This is, and was, no surprise to students of the
industry who argued that they were invalid from the outset. The rapid change of
direction by the Commission must be attributed, at least in part, to the mounting
evidence which demonstrates that the Commission's fears of the effects of cable
growth were exaggerated.
Finally, the FCC has never had specific legislative authority to regulate cable
television, a technology which was unknown when the Communications Act was
passed in 1934. It justified its regulatory embrace of cable by reference to general
language in a statute passed thirty years earlier,' inviting Congress to clarify this
authority. Congress never accepted this invitation, but the Commission proceeded
to place a regulatory yoke over cable operators nonetheless.2 Then, with no change
in legislation, the Commission almost immediately began to reduce this regulatory
burden, proposing virtually complete deregulation less than a decade after erecting
3
its elaborate cable rules.
I
THE INDUSTRY

Cable television is simply the distribution of video signals to households by
coaxial cable. 4 There is no technological reason why this form of distribution
should not have preceded distribution via the electromagnetic spectrum, but in fact
it did not. Cable television began as "community" antenna television service, simply
retransmitting local broadcast signals in areas of poor reception. A tower or
antenna would be erected on a nearby hill or tall building, and the signals from
this antenna distributed to local residents by coaxial cable.
Cable operators soon realized that viewers might value additional viewing
options, so they began to "import" signals from nearby markets. At first, these
broadcast signals were received by the main antenna; in time, operators began to
use microwave relay systems to import them, sometimes over great distances. The
fact that the cable industry offered signals of licensed broadcasters imported by
regulated communications common carriers was an obvious invitation for regulation
of this new medium.
The growth of the industry was rapid throughout the 1950s and 1960s (see
Table I), but as late as 1969 only about 6 percent of the nation's households
subscribed to a cable service. 5 In the 1970s, growth slowed somewhat as the
industry expanded to more than 14 million subscribers or nearly 20 percent of all
television households. 6 Most of these subscribers are still located outside the major
markets, however, due to the quality of off-the-air television service in the larger

1. 48 Stat. 1064 (1939).
2. See 86-91, infra.
3. See 91-101, infra.
4. See generally, C. Pilnick & W. S. Baer, Cable Television: A Guide to the Technology, Rand Corporation,
R-1141-NSF (June 1973).
5. In 1969, there were 60.6 million households with television sets. Broadcasting Yearbook, B-176
(1978).
6. Television Digest, TELEVISION FACTBOOK, Services Volume 83a, 108a (1979).
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cities, the FCC policy of limiting distant-signal imports into these markets, and
important restrictions (now removed) on programming which could be offered on
a per-program or per-channel fee.
TABLE I
THE GROWTH OF THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY

Year

Number of Systems

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
e = estimated
SOURCE:

400
450
500
525
560
640
700
800
1,000
1,200
1,325
1,570
1,770
2,000
2,260
2,490
2,639
2,841
2,991
3,158
3,506
3,681
3,832
3,997
4,150 (e)

Number of Subscribers
150,000
300,000
350,000
450,000
550,000
650,000
725,000
850,000
950,000
1,085,000
1,275,000
1,575,000
2,100,000
2,800,000
3,600,000
4,500,000
5,300,000
6,000,000
7,300,000
8,700,000
9,800,000
10,800,000
11,900,000
13,000,000
14,100,000 (e)

TELEVISION FACTBOOK, Services Volume 83a (1979 ed).

The average cable television system is small, having fewer than 3,500 subscribers
and, most systems are located in relatively small cities. Most are owned by
corporations with other media interests: broadcasters (30.4 percent of all systems),
newspapers (12.7 percent), book or magazine publishers (10.8 percent), program
producers or distributors (17.5 percent), and theaters (4.1 percent).7 The six largest
owners of cable systems account for 29 percent of all cable subscribers. 8 These
companies are the most aggressive bidders for new franchises. Thus, while the

7. TELEVISION FACTBOOK, Services Volume, 83a, (1979).
8. FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, Preliminary Report on Prospects for Additional Networks, app.
(January 1980, preliminary) (Recent Trends in Cable Television Related to the Prospects for New
Television Networks).
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industry is largely comprised of small-scale operations due to its concentration in
the smaller towns and cities, there are already a number of large, national
companies operating cable systems and bidding for the rights to wire the major
markets.
In the past five years, there has been a new development. Cable operators are
no longer relying solely upon retransmission of local and distant broadcast signals
to attract subscribers. They now offer nonbroadcast channels of motion pictures,
sports, religious programming, and children's fare to viewers either as part of the
basic service or on a "pay" channel for which a separate fee is charged. 9
While there have been numerous proposals for expanding cable television from
an entertainment service into a multiple-purpose communications system providing
shopping services, educational programs, meter reading, burglar alarms, computer
interconnection, and a myriad of other one- and two-way communications services,
progress in this direction has been slow, and the newer services are not likely to be
a major source of revenues for cable systems in the foreseeable future. For
immediate policy concerns, cable television remains a home entertainment and
information service.
The following Section details the history of cable television regulation from the
origins of the industry to the present. Next, the development of the cable industry
during the brief period of deregulation which began in 1972 is described. Then,
we summarize the available evidence and present some new evidence on the effect
of cable on broadcasting, a subject which has preoccupied the FCC since the early
1960s. Finally, we briefly consider some policy issues which would remain even if
all restrictions were removed on the entertainment services that cable systems can
offer.
II
THE

REGULATORN'

HISTORY

The first cable television (CATV) system began operation in Astoria, Oregon in
1949; the first commercial system was initiated one year later in Lansford,
Pennsylvania. ° By the end of the 1950s, there were approximately 640 systems
serving about 650,000 subscribers, and the nascent industry had begun to receive
the attention of the FCC."' It is fair to say, however, that during this period the
attitude of the Commission was essentially one of "benign neglect," of permitting
cable to develop without government intervention absent a definitive showing that
such growth was not in the public interest.
A.

The "Auxiliary Service" Inquiry

The Commission's early views on cable television are provided extensively in its
Report and Order in its inquiry into the effect of cable and other "auxiliary services"
9. See text at 108-110 infra for a discussion of the new services.
10. Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations,
and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 FCC 403, 408 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Auxiliary Services Inquiry]. Robinson dates the first system as beginning service in
i- C..\( t.-L
Mahoney City, Penn. in 1948. Robinson, Introduction and General Background. in D-sRF(;ti.\I ii.
TELEVISION 5 (P. A. MacAvoy ed. 1977).
11.

TE LEVISION FACrBOoK, Services Volume. 76a (1978 ed.).
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on the development of television broadcasting.' 2 The Commission's basic concern,
one that continued over the two decades of cable regulation, was stated at the
outset of its Report:
...[t]here is presented a problem of conflicting interests and objectives. On the
one hand are the interest of the general public of the areas involved in the
preservation of a local television outlet, with the attendant advantages which a
community gains from having a local means of self-expression, and (in some cases
but not in all) the preservation of the only television service to some of the public,
such as rural residents who cannot be served by CATV. On the other hand is the
interest of another group, such as city residents who want and can afford to pay for
CATV service, in obtaining multiple television service, . . .13[emphasis in original]
The conflict the Commission described was the basis of the claims of some
broadcasters who argued that, where cable systems carry signals which viewers in
their markets cannot receive over-the-air, local stations lose audiences and advertising
revenues. This, in turn, leads to a reduction in local service and, in the extreme, to
the local station being forced off the air. Thus, the broadcasters held, if cable were
permitted to import distant signals, some viewers might lose their only television
service. It is illuminating to study how this claim influenced the next two decades
of government regulatory policy toward cable.
In examining the "evidence" presented on the relation of station viability to the
existence of cable and the other auxiliary services the Commission first concluded
that:
Of some 96 stations which have gone off the air since 1952 .. .in only 3 cases has
the existence of an auxiliary service in the station's community or service area ...
been mentioned as a factor in the demise. We have no reason to believe that there
are any other cases
4 in which the presence of an auxiliary service has been a
substantial factor.'
The Commission then examined the impact of the auxiliary service, CATV, in the
three cases mentioned. It pointed out that in one case the station was actually a
satellite which rebroadcast the signal of another station and that it operated under
severe technical handicaps. It noted that a second station had resumed operation;
in any event, it was in a small market where other stations could be received over
the air. Finally, it pointed out that other signals could be received over the air in
the third station's market and it suffered from the fact that it operated in the UHF
band. In short, the Commission's reading of the evidence led it to conclude that
while "there is an impact upon television stations . . . from the operation of
auxiliary services of substantial size which bring competing signals into the stations's
home communities. . . . we cannot tell at what point . . .this impact becomes
serious enough to threaten the stations's continued existence or serious degradation
' 5
of the extent and quality of its service."'
The Commission indicated at this early date that it intended to examine
allegations of economic injury to local broadcasters that affect their ability to

12.

13.
14.
15.

Auxiliary Services Inquiry, supra note 10.
Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 421-22.
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provide local service. In a case decided the previous year, the courts held that the
Commission was required to provide an opportunity to a broadcaster to make a
showing that the licensing of a competing station would result in a diminution of
service to the public.' 6 The Commission indicated that it would permit similar
showings with respect to auxiliary service stating: "[w]e will take into accountwhen and to the extent that it can be established-such adverse economic impact (of
such character as to be of detriment to the public interest) as may result to the
local station." It should be noted, however, as the court pointed out in Carroll, that
proof of such economic injury "'is certainly a heavy burden."'" 17 [emphasis in
original]
In short, the Commission made it clear that it believed the public would benefit
substantially from essentially unfettered growth of auxiliary services, including
cable: ". . . [W]e do not now envision where we could find that the public interest
would be disserved by affording an opportunity for choice of service and the
benefits of competition and diversity of expression."' 8 The only possible exception
might be where it was the only local broadcast service whose existence was
threatened: ". .. [T]here is some merit in the broadcasters' position [that the 'only
service' must be maintained] . . . especially ... where the number losing their only
service is considerably greater than the number who would receive the multiple
service." 1 Although the Commission thought that a better case might be made for
limiting cable where it threatened the existence of the only local service, even in
such instances, the elimination of local service would not, by itself, be determinative.
A comparison of the numbers of viewers involved would also be required.
The Commission also reached a judgment about the use of its licensing of
common carriers to carry distant signals to cable systems:
. .it has been urged by most of the broadcasters that the Commission is obligated
...to consider the impact upon a television broadcaster of the grant of radio
facilities to a communication common carrier, where the common carrier facilities
will be used for the purpose of providing communication service to a community
antenna system operating in competition with the broadcaster .... In essence, the
broadcasters' position shakes down to the fundamental proposition that they wish
us to regulate in a manner favorable toward them vis-a-vis any non-broadcast
competitive 20enterprise. . . .The logical absurdity of such a position requires no
*

elaboration.

The Commission did feel that regulation might be required in two areas. First,
the Commission had been asked to rule that Section 325(a) of the Communications
Act, which forbids the rebroadcast of the signal of a broadcast station without its
permission, applied also to the retransmission by cable systems of broadcast signals.

16. Carroll Broadcasting v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (1958).
17. Supra note 10, at 435.
18. Id. at 437.
19. Id. at 438.
20. Id. at 431-32. In J. E. Belknap and Associates, 18 FCC 642 (1954), the Commission had made its
first authorization for the construction of microwave relay stations to carry distant signals to cable systems.
The considerations the Commission deemed relevant to the grant were the absence of diversion of traffic
from other carriers and the fact that the grantee was legally, financially, and technically qualified. The
economic impact on local broadcasters was not even mentioned.
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The Commission indicated that it did "not believe that ... [S]ection 325(a) in its
present form includes the requirement that CATVs get the consent of the stations
whose signals they carry." 2 1 But, the Commission went on, ". .. [W]e intend to
recommend to Congress that an appropriate amendment to [Slection 325(a) be
enacted, so as to extend the 'consent' requirement to CATVs." 22 This marks the
first public-policy pronouncement in favor of "retransmission consent," an issue
which has remained before the Commission for over two decades in one form or
another.
The Commission also found favor with the suggestion that cable systems be
required to carry the signals of local or nearby stations (if they so request) and
indicated that it would recommend such an amendment to the Communications
Act. 3 However, it rejected a proposal that cable systems be forbidden to duplicate
programs carried by local stations,2 4 even when those stations protest the duplication.
A final concern of the Commission was its jurisdiction over CATV. Four
possible bases for regulation had been suggested by broadcasters. The Commission
reaffirmed its decision in Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier25 that cable systems
could not be regulated as common carriers under the Communications Act since
cable systems, not subscribers, choose what is carried. 26 The Commission also
concluded that CATV systems could not be regulated as broadcasters under the
Act since such systems do not broadcast, but transmit by wire. 2 7 Third, the
Commission rejected the proposition that it had plenary power over cable because
of its impact upon an activity, broadcasting, which the Commission does regulate. 2 s
Finally, as noted above, the Commission determined that Section 325(a) of the Act
did not grant it jurisdiction over cable, but indicated that it would seek an
amendment applying this section to cable as well as to broadcasters.
The 1950s ended with a Commission doubtful about its jurisdiction over cable
and, more importantly, with little inclination to seek to extend its mandate to give
it increased authority over the new medium. Both of the changes it sought-the
extension of the retransmission consent requirement to cable and the requirement
that cable systems carry local signals-would be accomplished through legislation
and the Commission would not engage in detailed regulation. Indeed, the Commission
appeared to view quite modestly its ability to determine whether cable entry into a
particular market was likely to harm the public interest. While it felt obligated to
permit local broadcasters to demonstrate such harm, it clearly believed that successful
showings would be rare. The shift in Commission policy which would occur in the
next decade could thus not be predicted by examining its view at the end of the
1950s.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Supra note 10, at 430.
Id.
Id. at 439.
id.
24 FCC 251 (1958).
Supra note 10, at 427-28.
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 429.
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A Change in Policy: Carter Mountain

The first policy change occurred in connection with what appeared to be a
routine authorization of microwave facilities to carry broadcast signals to cable
systems.2 9 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. had applied for FCC authorization
and, nine days after the Commission's report on the impact of "auxiliary services"
on television broadcasting, its application was granted without a hearing. Shortly
thereafter, a protest was filed by a local broadcast station and the effective date of
the authorization was suspended. In 1961, the Commission's Hearing Examiner,
echoing the Commission's views in the auxiliary services inquiry, denied the
protest:
. .whatever impact the operations of the CATV systems may have on protestant's
operation of station KWRB-TV, these are matters of no legal significance to the
ultimate determination made that a grant of the subject application of Carter, a
bona fide communications common carrier, will serve the public interest.
*

Even if considered, the record precludes any reliable approach to an accurate
estimate of that 'impact.' . . . How can it be determined in what manner and to
what extent the boosters admittedly in operation, the operating CATV systems,
and/or other media such as radiobroadcasting
or newspapers contribute to the
40
competition to which KWRB-TV is exposed?
A year later, on appeal to the Commission, the authorization was denied.3 1 In
what can only be regarded as a startling reversal of its earlier views, the Commission
argued:
A grant of common carrier radio facilities requires a finding that the public interest
will be served thereby; certainly the well-being of existing television facilities is an
aspect of this public interest. Thus it is not only appropriate, it is necessary that we
determine whether the use of the facility applied for would directly or indirectly
bring about the
elimination of the only television transmission or reception service
32
to the public.
Moreover, the Commission apparently no longer harbored doubts about its
ability to determine whether cable would harm broadcasters: "If the CATV pattern
is permitted to be altered . . . [the local station] ...would find it more difficult to
sell its advertising in face of split audience, and this situation .. .results in our
33
judgment that the demise of this local operation would result."
Finally, where previously it could find no reason why it should not afford "an
opportunity for choice of service and the benefits of competition and diversity of
expression" it now found:
...[A] grant of the instant application would permit the rendition of better service
by the CATV, but at the expense of destroying the local station and its rural
coverage .... It must be concluded .. .the need for the local outlet and the service
29. The history of this proceeding is recounted in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 FCC 459
(1962).
30. Id. at 486 n. 31.
31. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 FCC 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d. 359 (D.C.Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
32. 32 FCC at 461.
33. Id. at 464.
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which it would provide to outlying areas outweighs the need for the improved
service which Carter would furnish . . .34
The Commission invited Carter to refile its application if it could show that the
cable system would carry the signal of the local station and not carry the signals of
other stations which duplicated its programming.
C.

Rules Concerning Microwave-Served CATV

Three years later, the Commission moved to codify its policies respecting the
authorization of microwave facilities which served cable systems. 35 First, it asserted
broad jurisdiction over cable television: "We have determined . . . that the
Communications Act vests in this agency appropriate rulemaking authority over all
CATV systems, including those which do not use microwave relay service .. "36
Second, the FCC stated a clear intention to treat cable as a service supplementary
to the basic broadcast service: "The fundamental question we consider . . . [is]
whether we should impose by rule certain conditions upon microwave grants
designed to limit and regulate the manner in which CATV competes with the
basic, off-the-air television broadcast service to which it is an adjunct." [emphasis
added] 37 It determined that cable would be permitted to provide a supplementary
service in areas of poor television reception where it provided only the signals of
local stations or where it extended broadcast signals into areas beyond the range of
any off-the-air signals, i.e., where it did not compete with local broadcasters.
Third, the Commission clearly articulated the objectives of its policies: ". ..[If
CATV operations should drive out television broadcasting service, the public as a
whole would lose far more - in free service, in service to outlying areas, in local
service with local control and selection of programs - than it would gain." 38 The
Commission argued, further, that its plan for the assignments of television stations,
"is predicated upon the social desirability of having a large number of local outlets
with diversity of control over disseminating sources rather than a few stations
'3 9
serving vast areas of populations."
Finally, on the issue of harm, the Commission stated clearly that it would err on
the side of caution:
Our responsibilities are not discharged . . . by withholding action until indisputable
proof of irreparable damage to the public interest in television broadcasting has
been compiled . . . we must plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of
waiting to react to them.4"
[..
(T]hese proceedings do not turn upon a showing that CATV competition is
demonstrably certain to cause widespread and serious damage to the public interest
in television broadcasting. We think the basic fact that CATV service, while entirely
dependent upon television broadcasting, also offers substantial competition to
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at
Rules
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

464-65.
re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 FCC 683 (1965).
685.
684.
700.
699-700.
701.
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television station outlets is enough to justify regulation designed to insure 41that the
competition involved is conducted under fair and reasonable conditions.
There were to be two kinds of regulations, both in the form of conditions
imposed on the authorization of microwave facilities to serve cable systems. One
requirement was that the cable system carry the signals of all local stations.4 2 The
second rule was that a cable system not carry the programs of a distant station
when they duplicated the programs of local stations during a period of fifteen days
before or after the local broadcast."3
Both requirements derived from the Commission's view that the competition
provided by cable television systems to local broadcasters is different from the
competition provided by additional broadcast stations. When a cable system did not
carry the local signals, a viewer subscribing to the service could only receive a local
station by disconnecting the cable and attaching an antenna. To the extent that this
proved cumbersome, access to cable subscribers was denied to local broadcasters.
The requirement that local signals be carried was designed to remedy this
difficulty.""
The nonduplication requirement was designed to deal with the fact that cable
systems carried broadcast signals without obtaining the consent of either the
originating station or the producers of its programs. 45 The Commission held: "The
CATV system that provides its subscribers with the signals of distant stations
presently stands outside of the program distribution process ... ''46 Also: ". . . [I]n

the absence of a market in which the question of competitive access to programming
by stations and CATVs can be resolved, our aim is to preserve for stations the
competitive exclusivity they have been able to obtain as against other stations, but
nothing more."' 4 7 The asserted rationale for the nonduplication rule was preservation
of this exclusivity.
Although the Commission's stated purpose in adopting these rules was to make
competition between broadcasting and cable "fair and reasonable," the Commission
clearly was concerned as much with the outcome as with the fairness of the
process: "The question at the heart of these proceedings is whether and to what
extent rulemaking action is necessary or appropriate to integrate CATV service
into our existing television system-to ensure that CATV performs its valuable

41.

Id. at 706-07.

42. Since the channel capacity of most cable systems was highly limited, a system of priorities was
established to determine which signals would be carried. As a result, some systems could not carry any
distant signals at all. Id. at 7 16-19.
43. The Commission had invited Carter Mountain to refile its application if it could meet similar
conditions. Id. at 721-30.
44. As the channel capacity of the typical cable system grew over time, this requirement became
increasingly innocuous. By the mid-1970s, more than 90 percent of all systems had at least a 12 channel
capacity, 1976 CATV SYSTEMis DIRECTORY, at A-2.
45. In the previous year, a broadcast station had sought to prevent the carriage of its signal by a cable
system and had been advised to seek relief under the Copyright Act. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc.,
335 F.2d. 348 (1964). It took almost a decade for the issue of copyright liability to be resolved definitively
by the courts, and then it was determined that cable systems were not liable.
46. 38 FCC at 704.
47. Id. at 720.
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supplementary role without unduly damaging or impeding the growth of television
"4 8
broadcast service.
The Commission continued to be concerned with the impact of cable in the
smallest markets, but its list of concerns had grown since 1959:
We think it clear .. .that the most serious effects will be felt by (1)stations in
smaller one-and two-station markets, where the public does not receive the full
services of all three national networks off-the-air, (2) by marginal stations in larger
markets, and (3) by new stations coming on the air.4 9
Since, by definition, there will always be marginal stations in larger markets so long
as not all channel assignments are filled, the Commission was no longer limiting its
purview to situations in which the only local broadcast service was threatened.
Indeed, it was likely that every market would contain at least one station in one of
the Commission's three areas of concern.
D.

The Second Report and Order

The following year, 1966, was a watershed in the regulation of cable. Never,
before or since, has the Commission's regulation of cable been more wide-ranging
or restrictive. In adopting its Second Report and Order,50 the Commission restated the
two bases of its previous policies:
Our determination to adopt the carriage and nonduplication requirements rested
on two basic grounds: (1) that failure to carry local stations and duplication of their
programs are unfair competitive practices, which are inconsistent with the
supplementary role of CATV . . . , and (2) that these requirements were necessary
to ameliorate the risk that the burgeoning CATV industry would have a future
adverse impact on television broadcast service, both existing and potential. ....I
In other words, the Commission's actions were designed to prevent "unfair"
competition by cable systems and to foreclose any "adverse impact" on broadcasting
that CATV growth might produce. The role of cable was to be that of a
"supplement" to the over-the-air broadcast system.
The Second Report and Order marked three notable shifts in FCC policy. First,
the Commission had progressed from 1959, when it claimed that it was unable to
measure the harm caused by cable, to a point where, seven years later, it stated
confidently that: "the materials before us would appear to indicate substantial
52
growth and substantial impact by CATV in the large markets. "

48.
49.
50.

Id. at 701.
Id. at 711.
Second Order and Report, 2 FCC 2d 725 (1966). For an analysis of the Commission's actions, see

E. Greenberg, Wire Television and the FCC's Second Report and Order on CATV Systems, IOJ. L. & E:oN. 181

(1967).
51. 2 FCC 2d at 736.
52. Interestingly, the bulk of the evidence to which the Commission refers is based on a study of
audience diversion in one and two station markets. The "Fisher report" was produced for the National
Association of Broadcasters and some of its findings appear in F. M. Fisher & V. E. Ferrall, Community
Antenna Television Systems and Local Television Station Audiences, 80 Q. J. E O.. 227 (1966). An amusing
sidelight in view of later developments is that evidence designed to minimize the impact of cable was
presented by the Columbia Broadcasting System which owned a number of cable systems. 2 FCC 2d at
744 n. 30.
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Second, as the previous quotation indicates, the Commission's locus of concern
had shifted from markets where the only local broadcast service is threatened by
cable to the major markets which have many stations:
We have selected the top 100 markets for special attention because it is in these
markets that UHF stations or wire pay-TV based upon CATV operations are most
likely to develop and therefore the problems raised are most acute .... the top 100
markets include roughly 90 percent of the television homes
in this country. Our
5
policy therefore focuses on the critically important areas. 3
In markets below the top 100, the independent UHF (or VHF) station is much less
likely to develop; the stations in such markets are apt to be three or less in number
and network affiliated. This means, in turn, that the nonduplication provision is
effective ....

Further, it is in the markets below 100 that there may be underserved
4

areas where CATV can make its most valuable and traditional contribution.'

Indeed, the Commission remarked that many small markets were not served by all
three networks and that cable could provide this service. But although rules
preventing cable systems from carrying distant signals that duplicate the programs
of local stations would provide some protection, the carriage of the programming
of the other networks could be expected to have a large effect on the audiences of
these stations.5 5 Thus, to the extent that cable extended network service to these
markets, it was bound to threaten the viability of local stations and, thus, their
ability to serve as media of local self-expression. Nevertheless, the Commission was
apparently willing to run this risk.
Third, for the first time in its deliberations respecting cable, the Commission
expressed concern for the impact that cable growth might have on the emergence
of UHF television stations, especially in the major markets. The Commission's
policy of placing many television allocations in the UHF band and intermixing
VHF and UHF stations in the same markets, established in its Sixth Report and
Order on Television Allocations,' 6 had encountered serious problems. Many, of the
UHF stations which had gone on the air in 1954 had failed. 57 More than 40
percent of UHF stations reported operating at a loss compared to less than 15
percent of VHF stations. 5 8 A variety of Commission policies designed to deal with
the UHF problem had run into Congressional resistance and had been abandoned. 5'
With the passage of the All-Channel Receiver Act in 1962, and the subsequent
enactment of Commission rules to implement its provisions, the Commission
assumed responsibility for the healthy growth of UHF. In its Second Report and
Order, the Commission determined that the expansion of cable would harm the

53.
54.
55.

2 FCC 2d at 783.
Id.
Subsequent studies confirmed this point. See R. G. Noi.i, NI.

J. PECK. & I.. . Nb ( N , E('ONOMI
162-63 (1973): R. E. PARK, P( EF IESIItII'.A\ IF C Ait F (;R)\V
OW
(0N
TELEVISION BROADCASTIN(; 68 (1970).
56. 1 RAD. REG. (P&F) 91:599, pt. 3 (1952).
57. D. W. Webbink, The Impact of UHF Promotion: The All Channel Teleoisio, Receiver Laz, 34: 3 L. &
CONTESIP. PROB. 535, 545-46 (1969).
58. FCC, TV BROADCAST FINANCIAL DAT,\-1966, Table 5 (August 5. 1967).
59. For a history of these efforts see Note. "he Darkened (;hamels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75
ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION

HAR . L. RFv. 578 (1962).
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prospects for UHF. 60 Thus, the Commission concluded, cable development would
have to be tightly circumscribed in those markets where it believed that UHF
prospects were brightest, the top 100.
The Commission's new cable policy had two facets. First, it extended to all cable
systems, not just those employing microwave, the requirement that all local stations
be carried and that imported signals not duplicate local programming. 6 1 Second,
and more importantly, the Commission announced that it would not permit the
carriage of a distant broadcast signal into one of the top 100 markets without a
showing in an evidentiary hearing that such carriage "would be consistent with the
public interest, and particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of
UHF television broadcast service." 62 Thus, even cable systems which adhered to the
local carriage and nonduplication rules would still be required to demonstrate that
63
their carriage of distant signals would not threaten even marginal UHF stations.
The requirement of an evidentiary hearing, had it been followed in every case,
would have imposed an enormous burden on the resources of the Commission.
Indeed, a significant backlog developed.64 However, in a number of cases the
Commission waived the hearing requirement when it could be determined, on the
basis of information provided by the cable system and local broadcasters, that
importation of a distant signal would not adversely affect established or proposed
UHF stations. 65 These waivers tended to be granted when the cable system served a
small community on the fringe of a market.66 In the only evidentiary hearing
completed for a major market,6 7 the Commission reversed the decision of its
Hearing Examiner and imposed restrictions on the ability of one of the San Diego
cable systems to carry the signals of Los Angeles independent stations. This
decision, combined with the administrative burden of the evidentiary hearing
process, made it clear that the development of cable in the major markets would be
stopped completely unless the rules were regularly evaded by staff action or were
abandoned completely.
The Commission also discussed four areas in which it thought Congressional
action might be required. First, it sought clarification concerning its authority to
60. 2 FCC 2d at 774-77. In doing so, the Commission rejected the contention, made by the National
Cable Television Association, that UHF stations would benefit from the presence of cable because it would
deliver their signals on a par with those of VHF. This contention was supported by independent studies
carried out subsequently. See, e.g., PARK, supra note 55.
61. The nonduplication protection was reduced to the same day. 2 FCC 2d at 743.

62.

2 FCC 2d at 782.

63. The activities of cable systems that were already carrying distant signals into the major markets
were "grandfathered." Thus, Mission Cable TV in San Diego, which began operation in 1962 and is
presently the largest system in the country, was permitted to continue to carry the signals of Los Angeles
stations.
64. D. R. LEDUc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC 173-74 (1973).

65. See, e.g., Resort Television Cable Co., 12 FCC 2d 272 (1968); Unicable, Inc., 6 FCC 2d 771 (1967):
Gateway Cable T.V., Inc., 6 FCC 2d 412 (1967).
66. One observer attributes this to the ability of the Commission's Cable Task Force to obtain waivers
"for cable systems operating in markets too small to be of particular interest to the Commission." R. 0.
BERNER, CONSTRAINTS ON THE REGULATORY PROCESS: A CASE STUD'

OF THE REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVI-

SION 19 (1976).

67.

Midwest Television, Inc., 13 RAD. REG. (P&F) 2d 698 (1968).
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regulate cable. Second, it requested legislation forbidding cable systems from
originating programs since it feared that otherwise cable might bid programs away
from "free" television and viewers would be forced to pay for such programs.
Third, it requested consideration of an amendment to the Communications Act to
require that cable systems obtain the consent of the originating station before
retransmitting its programs.6 8 Finally, it sought a clarification of the division of
jurisdictional responsibilities between the Federal government and the states and
localities.
E.

Affirmation of Jurisdiction

The years immediately following the Second Report and Order were eventful ones
for cable regulation. Despite the fact that the Commission did not obtain Congressional
support on the question of its jurisdiction over cable (indeed, it has yet to do so),
the Commission's authority to adopt the rules contained in its Second Report and
Order was upheld by the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable.69 While Southwestern
pointed to the failure of the Congress to authorize the regulation of cabledespite requests by the FCC that it do so-as evidence that the Commission lacked
such authority, the Court concluded otherwise. Relying on the Communications
Act, which obligates the Commission to provide "a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution" of television service, and on the Commission's findings that achievement
of this goal requires the use of the UHF band and that cable threatens UHF
television, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's authority to regulate cable.
Without determining the limits of the Commission's regulatory authority, the Court
found that the rules adopted in 1966 were "reasonably ancillary" to the fulfillment
of the Commission's responsibilities in regulating broadcasting . 7y"
F.

The Copyright Question

As the Commission made clear in its Second Report and Order, the fact that when
cable television imported distant signals it "stands outside of the program distribution
process" was a matter of some concern. Henry Geller, General Counsel to the
Commission at the time has argued that the Second Report can best be understood
as a holding action until this issue was definitely resolved in the courts. He argued,
further, that the Commission was prepared to relax or eliminate its distant signal
rules, when, as was generally anticipated, federal courts held that cable systems
7
were liable when they carried distant signals without obtaining permission. 1
The matter received the attention of the courts when a program supplier,
relying on the Copyright Act of 1909, sued a cable system for carrying the
68. The "reasonably ancillary" criterion has been invoked elsewhere in extending the range of
Commission jurisdiction. For example, the Commission's authority to regulate the granting of access to
political candidates to the time of the networks has been upheld recently on the grounds that such

regulation is "reasonably ancillary" to the achievement of the Commission's statutory mandate to provide
access to the time of stations. CBS, Inc. v FCC, No. 79 2403 (D.C. Cir. March 14, 1980).
69. A similar request had been made in 1959.
70.

United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).

71. Personal communication, from Henry Geller to Stanley Besen. reviewing manuscript for the Rand
Corporation.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 44: No. I

supplier's programs on an imported signal. Both the District Court 72 and the Court
of Appeals 73 ruled that the cable system was engaged in a "performance" within
the meaning of the Act and was liable for copyright infringement. However, in
1968, the Supreme Court, reversing the decisions of the lower courts, held that the
carriage of the signals in question was not a violation on the grounds that the
74
activities of cable systems are closer to those of viewers than of broadcasters.
That same year, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Notice of Inquiry in Docket 18397• 75 In the Notice in which the Commission solicited
comments on prohibition of cross-ownership of cable systems and broadcast stations
in the same market, limitation of the multiple ownership of cable systems, and
restriction of originated programming to only a single cable; it also announced that
it was abandoning its hearing procedures for granting permission to import distant
signals into the major markets. 76 It concluded that the facts which these proceedings
were designed to elicit were now clear:
...[Plotential CATV penetration is likely to be substantial on the order of half the
homes in [for example, the San Diego] market ....
We are also convinced that a
penetration of this order could pose a real threat to UHF development and that the
unfair competition would be significant."
In place of the hearing procedure the Commission proposed that importation
of distant signals be permitted only when a cable system obtained the consent of
the originating station. It announced, further, that it would entertain requests to
authorize distant signal carriage only from systems operating in accordance with
the proposed retransmission consent rules.
G.

Cablecasting: Prescriptive Rather than Proscriptive Regulation

In 1969, the Commission addressed the issue of origination by requiring all
cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers to originate programming. 78 The
Commission described the benefits which could be expected from origination and
why it had refused to accede to broadcaster requests that origination be banned
entirely because it would divert audience from "free" television:
. . [[W]e do not think that the public should be deprived of an opportunity for
greater diversity merely because a broadening of selections may spread the audience
and reduce the size of the audience for any particular selection. Such competition is
not unfair, since broadcasters and CATV . . . originators stand 79
on the same footing
in acquiring the program material with which they compete.
In addition, the Commission saw benefits from the potential for cable networking
of originated programming:

72.

United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

73.

377 F.2d 872 (1967).

74.

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television. Inc.. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).

75.
76.

15 FCC 2d 417 (1968).
See the discussion of the administration of the hearing procedures in 392 U.S. at 000.

77.

15 FCC 2d at 430.

78.
79.

First Report and Order, 20 FCC 2d 201 (1969).
Id. at 203.
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We strongly believe that the promise of this new technology should not be stifled by
foreclosing the possibilities that some of these . . . channels might be opened to
others on a common carrier basis and that significant new diversity of programnming
and other services might be brought to the American people through regional or
national interconnection, including competition to the present three national television
networks 80

But despite the Commission's words, some doubts remained about its sincerity.
First, the Commission imposed a rule limiting advertising on originated programming
to "natural breaks" which reduced the attractiveness of providing such programs
on an advertiser-supported basis. Second, by leaving the question whether to
permit advertising on cable network operation "open," it discouraged such networking.
Finally, while it stated that it saw no need to place limits on originated programs
supported by direct subscriber payments, in the following year it did just that.
In extending the rules which had been applied to over-the-air pay television to
pay-cable operations, the Commission stated that:
where cablecasting is accompanied by a per-program or per-channel fee, it is akin
to subscription television and presents the same threat of siphoning programs awav
from free television in favor of a service limited to those . . . to whom the cable is
geographically available. Remedial action in this area should not wait upon the

threat becoming actuality. 8 1

The rules prevented cablecasting for which a per-program or per-channel charge
was made of:
(i) movies which had been in theatrical release more than 2 years prior to the
cablecast,
(ii) sporting events which had been telecast in the community on a nonsubscription basis during the previous two years, and
(iii) series programming of any type.
These regulations also limited feature films and sporting events to 90 percent or
less of total programming hours and banned advertising on pay channels entirely.
It is hardly surprising, with the array of restrictions which the Commission had
imposed on originated programming, that little cable origination occurred and that
the industry expended efforts both to be free of the origination requirement and
of the restrictions on the programming that could be offered.
H. After the Freeze-Cable Television in the Seventies
Cable entered the 1970s as a small business8 2 relegated principally to rural areas
and small communities' 3 and held hostage by television broadcasters to the
Commission's hope for the development of UHF. The opportunity for cable to
80.
81.

Id. at 207-08.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC 2d 825, 828 (1970). The pay rules for over-the-air

stations appear in Rules and Regulations to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 15 FCC 2d 466
(1968).
82,

On January 1, 1970, there were 2,490 operating systems with 4.5 million subscribers. TV
Services Volume 76a (1978 ed.).
83. A few larger systems existed in major cities but these were constructed prior to 1966 or in areas
with poor over-the-air reception. See TV FACTBOOK, Services Volume, for a listing of all cable systems.
FACTBOOK,
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break these shackles occurred when Dean Burch replaced Rosel Hyde as Chairman
of the FCC, several other Commissioners' terms expired, and the Office of
Telecommunications Policy was established under Clay T. Whitehead.
Is is not very difficult to characterize the political obstacles to cable development
which faced Burch and Whitehead. They were:
(i) The continuing fear that distant signal importation would imperil the
development of UHF broadcasting and reduce the rents flowing from VHF
broadcasting in major markets.
(ii) The failure of the courts and Congress to resolve the cable copyright
problem which caused copyright owners (producers, artists, motion picture
companies) to ally themselves with broadcasters.
(iii) The concern that cable systems would not serve "the public interest' by
extending an array of new services to the communities they served. Some
feared that they would simply augment the entertainment choices for
subscribers while threatening to diminish the choices available on advertisersupported commercial stations for households unable to afford subscriptions
to cable services.
If large-market UHF protection could have been assured and a few bones could
have been thrown to the proponents of public service programming, a political
compromise might have been possible to allow the cable to grow in the larger
market.
The first attempt at compromise was unsuccessful, but it managed to reinvigorate
the policy discussion. The "public dividend" plan proposed in June 1970 would
have allowed importation of four distant broadcast signals into the major markets
in return for a payment of 5 percent of their revenues by cable systems into a fund
for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a schedule for copyright payments to
be legislated by Congress, and a requirement that cable systems substitute local
UHF stations' commercials for those originally included in the programs on
imported broadcast signals. 8 ' The proposal was obviously designed to obtain the
support of public broadcasters and UHF operators for relaxing the rules on distant
signal carriage.8 5 The proposed rulemaking was adopted by a 4-to-3 vote with one
of the dissenting opinions holding that the proposed rules were too restrictive. The
proposals proved too complex to win public acceptance. however, and the rules
were never adopted.
Burch initiated a second attempt at compromise with an August 1971 letter to
the Congressional communications subcommittee chairmen.8 6 The letter detailed a
proposal which Burch would attempt to have the Commission adopt quickly unless
Congress objected. The proposal, which was very similar to the final "consensus"
which emerged as the Commission's 1972 rules, included provisions to allow
84. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket 18397-A, 24 FCC 2d 580 (1970).
85. See LeDuc, supra note 64, at 191-92 for a discussion of this proposal and the activities which
followed.
86. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 FCC 2d 241, 260-79 (1972).
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importation of sufficient signals to allow cable systems in the top 50 markets to
offer three network plus three independent signals; systems in markets 51-100
were allowed three network plus two independent signals; systems outside the top
100 markets could import three network signals plus one independent. Systems
more than 35 miles from the nearest licensed station would be exempt from these
limitations, but all systems would be subject to "leapfrogging" restrictions- requiring
the importation of the nearest UHF or VHF independent station, rather than the
most attractive one. All home market signals had to be carried, and each station
could import two "wild card" signals if its minimum service requirements could be
achieved using only local signals.
As a fillip to the public service proponents, the Commission proposed mandatory
origination requirements on at least three channels and a minimum twenty-channel
capacity. These requirements had the incidental effect of increasing the cost of
cable service, 87 thereby reducing its potential threat to broadcasters, but increasing
its allure to those who wanted to force cable to be more than a mere entertainment
service.
Implicit in the Commission proposal was the assumption that Congress would
legislate copyright provisions for cable signal importations and that all parties
would support such legislation. The letter of intent became the basis for the rules
which were finally adopted. However, in order to bring broadcasters into the
consensus, a more restrictive rule for the definition of local signals from nearby
markets, extending program exclusivity to non-network fare, and strengthening
the leapfrogging rules were included. 8 8
The 1972 cable rules can only be described as baroque (see Table II). They
limited the importation of distant signals in a manner which varied with market
size; they provided that "significantly viewed" signals from adjacent markets could
be carried in addition to the distant-signal quota and provided an intricate test for
determining whether a signal was "significantly viewed," they continued the mandatory
carriage requirement for local signals; they provided for two different forms of
exclusivity protection for non-network (syndicated) programs; and they placed a
rather heavy burden of local origination, franchising, and technical standards upon
all cable operators. These rules are detailed in Table II; a thorough discussion of
them is beyond the scope of this paper. As we shall see, thorough enforcement of
them proved to be beyond the wherewithal of the Commission.
Despite the numerous restrictions on cable services that they contained, the new
rules were clearly a liberalization of policy. Where distant signal importation into
major markets had previously been virtually prohibited, now at least a modicum of
such importation could take place. But why did the Commission move from its
rigid anti-cable stance? Why did broadcasters allow such a liberalization? There are
a number of possible answers.

87.

For an assessment of these costs, see Comanor and Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The FCC and

Cable Television, 15 J. L. & EcoN. 177, 183-88 (1972).

88.

Cable Television Report and Order, 36 FCC 2d 241. 284-86. The rules are analyzed in Besen,

The Economics of the Cable Television 'Consensus', 17 J. L. & EoN. 39 (1974).
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II
CABLE RULES

Markets 1-50

Markets 51-100

All local signals
3 network stations
3 Independents
2 Independents**

All local signals
All local signals
All local signals*
3 network stations 3 network stations
2 Independents
I Independent
Any other signals
2 Independents** None

Smaller Markets

Outside all Markets

Leapfrogging

If either or both of the first two independents is from
among the top 25 markets they must be from one or
both of the two closest such markets.

Exclusivity

No carriage of a
syndicated program during a
period one year
after the program is sold
anywhere in the
U.S.

During run of
exclusive contract
to a local station

None

None

None

During run of
exclusive contract
to a local station
Channel capacity

Minimum of 20
Channels

No requirement

Program originationRequired of all systems with 3,500 or more subscribers.
Access

Free public, educational, and government access channels (one each); leased
access required for all unused channels.

Expansion of
capacity

Whenever all channels are in use 80 percent of weekdays for 80 percent of the
time during any 3 hour period for 6 weeks running an additional channel
must be added.

*The definition of local signals is slightly less stringent for stations outside a television market.
**Can be carried only to the extent they were not employed to meet the minimnum service standard.

First, the personalities had changed. For whatever reason, Burch and Whitehead

clearly were interested in promoting a policy which would permit some cable
growth in the major markets.
Second, the agreement on the part of cable interests to accept some form of
copyright liability when they retransmitted distant signals served to reduce the

opposition of program producers to cable growth.
Third, a number of economic studies published between

1966 and

1972 may

have allayed some of the Commission's fears.8s 9 Several of these studies-particularly
89. See, for example, R. E. Park, Cable Television and UHF Broadcasting, The Rand Corporation,
R-689-MF (1971); R. E. Park, Cable Television, UHF Broadcasting, and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J. L. &
EcoN. 207 (April 1972); J. J. McGowan, R. G. Noll & M. 1. Peck, Comments Regarding the Public Interest in
Commission Rules and Regulations Relating to Cable Television, Signal Importation and the Development of UHF
Independent Commercial Stations, FCC Docket 18397-A (Feb. 10, 197 1).
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those undertaken at the Rand Corporation9'('--demonstrated that UHF stations
might actually benefit from the presence of a local cable system. For many UHF
stations, the gain from being able to compete on an equal basis with local VHF
stations in homes served by cable was greater than any loss they might experience
from audience diversion to distant stations. Moreover, these studies demonstrated
that the gain in viewer welfare from the increase in viewing choices afforded by
cable could be substantial. 9 '
Finally, while the extent of the influence of these studies upon policy makers
remains an open question, they clearly provided support for the positions taken by
an increasingly powerful cable industry. That industry continued to grow between
1966 and 1970, nearly trebling in size as it continued to wire the smaller markets.
Simultaneously, large multiple system owners and equipment suppliers acquired
wider representation in Washington and some broadcasters acquired substantial
positions in cable, making it difficult for that industry to take a monolithic position
with respect to cable.
As the cable industry passed the 5 million subscriber level in 1971, with no
demonstrable harm to broadcasters, it became increasingly difficult to ignore the
accumulating evidence that the Commission's fear of injury to broadcasters was
overdrawn and the growing political power of' groups that would benefit from
cable growth. Some liberalization of the cable rules became an obvious course.
I.

The 1972 Rules: A Vulnerable Rationale
for a Policy of Protection

The 1972 rules reflected almost precisely the OTP-Burch-Industry agreement.
While these rules did not represent the high water mark for broadcast protectionism,
they were close. The obvious intent of rules was to continue to protect largemarket broadcasters while unburdening cable somewhat. But the detailed compromise
which was constructed had to withstand judicial and legislative scrutiny.
The FCC would defend its rules on the basis of the following considerations:
(i) Television would continue to be a local broadcast medium and the role of
cable would be as a supplement to the basic broadcast system. This
required that marginal broadcast stations-particularly UHF stations in
large markets-be protected from major audience diversion.
(ii) To the extent possible, cable systems would be required to originate
programming and to provide local access channels. Cable would thus have
to offer more than mere retransmission of distant broadcast signals.
(iii) The threat of program siphoning by pay-cable operators would be limited
in order to assure broadcasters a continuous flow of attractive programming.
This policy could succeed only as long as the Commission could be persuaded,
and could, in turn, persuade the courts, that the threat to broadcast revenues was

90.

See R. E. Park, supra note 89 and R. E. Park. A Bavesia Iminew'ok IM Thiking about the Role of
DE(ISI(ONM\KIN\
(1973).

Analysis, in Tile ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN RE(;L'rIsOR
91. See McGowan, Noll & Peck. supra note 89.
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sufficiently large to endanger traditional broadcast service, or at least to imperil the
provision of local and other public service programming. If experience were to
demonstrate that this threat did not exist, support for detailed regulation of cable
to protect broadcasting could crumble.
A second threat to the cable rules was a jurisdictional one. Although Southwestern
Cable had upheld the Commission's power to limit distant signal importation, it was
not clear whether that ruling extended to mandatory origination, minimum channel
capacity, and access requirements. Furthermore, the Commission's jurisdiction over
pay cable had never been upheld. Simply because the product offered by pay cable
was also offered by television licensees could not alone provide a basis. The
Commission clearly had no jurisdiction over motion picture theaters, the legitimate
stage, or professional sports arenas which also offer products that can be seen on
television.
In short, two potential threats confronted the consensus and the rules which
followed. On the one hand, the empirical rationale for the rules might be shown by
experience to be flawed. The supply of local television broadcasting services might
not be affected much by cable expansion. Equally important, though, was the
possibility that the courts would find that the Commission's protection of broadcasting
exceeded its jurisdiction. Both threats materialized quickly in the next few years.
J.

The "Reregulation" Effort

The political tide against regulation had already begun to turn by 1974. Senator
Kennedy had held hearings aimed at deregulating the airlines. 92 Some reaction
against the newer forms of health, safety and environmental regulation was
beginning, and by 1975, the White House had identified regulation not only as a
major problem, but as a contributor to inflation.
These political forces immediately affected the FCC. In 1974, the Commission
instituted a "Reregulation Task Force" for cable television, and began to reexamine
its 1972 rules. Two years later, the House Communications Subcommittee issued a
report which was clearly hostile to the protectionist nature of the 1972 rules. 93 The
President's Council of Economic Advisers even attempted to adopt cable deregulation
as a plank in the Administration's regulatory reform platform. 94 A strong reaction
from broadcasters forced the White House to withdraw its proposals for relaxation
of distant-signal and pay-cable rules, but the FCC reregulation effort proceeded
with implicit support from Congress.
It was clear that full enforcement of the rules by the new Cable Bureau would
be very difficult, if not impossible. They were extremely detailed, requiring
approval of franchise agreements, supervision of the number and identity of all
signal importations, enforcement of technical requirements, and enforcement of
92.

Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Subcommittee on the

Judiciary, Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practice and Procedure, 94th Cong., Ist. Sess. (1975).

93.

STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS

FOREIGN COMMERCE,

OF THE HOUSE COMIIT-FEF ON INTERSTAT E AND

CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE,

Sess., (Subcomm. Print 1976).

94.

These efforts are described in Robinson, supra note 10, at 13-21.

94th Cong., 2d
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program exclusivity on every imported commercial signal in the largest 100
markets. With more than 3,000 systems in operation, it would be naive to expect
thorough, consistent enforcement of all of these rules.
Equally important, the numerous provisions could hardly be justified as necessary
to protect UHF broadcasting. If, for instance, very small systems were granted
exemptions from the rules, it would be unlikely that UHF stations would be
imperiled. Similarly, if signal-carriage requirements were waived during periods of
limited viewing, it could not be argued that broadcast stations would suffer. Nor
was there reason to believe that the leapfrogging requirements would protect UHF
stations. 9 5 The Reregulation Task Force recognized the vulnerability of many of
these provisions. Accordingly, it attacked them one at a time.
The reregulation effort produced only small changes at first. In 1974, the
Commission allowed cable systems to import unlimited signals during periods in
which local stations were not broadcasting. '9 This rule was adopted because the
Commission concluded that
."importation . . .would have no adverse impact on
stations which already were off the air."9' 7 Further liberalization occurred in 1976,
when the Commission allowed importation of foreign language and religious
stations without limit. 98 That same year, the FCC permitted cable systems to offer
network news feeds not broadcast on the stations normally carried by the cable
system. 99 Together these rules changes were rather inconsequential-a factor
which must have been important in selecting them as the first candidates for
liberalization. Each was adopted because the Commission held that no significant
injury to broadcasters would result.
A more important change for cable operators was the abandonment of the
leapfrogging restrictions.'0 0 Several reasons were given for this change in policy.
Although the Commission had hoped that such restrictions would lead cable
owners to import nearby stations, which served communities with cultural or
economic ties 'to the cable system market, it now found such ties did not exist in
many cases.' 0 ' The Commission also cited the economic burden which resulted
when the construction of special microwave routes to import these signals was
required. Finally, the Commission was moved to reconsider because it felt that the
threat of the development of "superstations" (independent stations in major markets
95.

The proposed leapfrogging rules in Chairman Burch's Letter of Intent had provided specific

protection for UHF stations but this provision was dropped in the rules finally adopted.

96. Rules and Regulations Relative to Carriage of Late-Night Television Programming by Television
Systems, 48 FCC 2d 699 (1974).
97. 48 FCC 2d 699 (1974).
98. Rules and Regulations Relative to Adding a New Definition For "Specialty Stations" and Specialty
Format Programming and Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules. 58 FCC 2d 442 (1976);
reconsid. denied, 60 FCC 2d 661 (1976).

99. Rules and Regulations Relative to Cable Television Systems and the Carriage of Network News
Programs on Cable Television Systems, 57 FCC 2d 68 (1976).
100. Rules and Regulations with Respect to Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television
Carriage, 57 FCC 2d 625 (1976). Some waivers of these provisions had been granted previously.
101. In some cases, the effect of the rule was to force the carriage of stations where the tie was
weaker. For example, systems in western New York state were required to carry signals from Pittsburgh
or Cleveland and those in northeast New York were required to carry signals from Boston or Hartford,
rather than signals from New York City.
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whose signals would be carried by cable systems nationwide) was overstated. As it
10 2
turned out, this threat materialized within a year or two.
After the leapfrogging provisions were eliminated, the Commission issued a
most significant ruling for cable systems, authorizing the use of 4.5, meter,
receive-only satellite earth stations.' 0 3 While not a liberalization of the cable rules,
the decision represented a major cost-saving for cable operators who previously
had been required to use earth stations of a minimum diameter of 9 meters. As a
result, the economics of distant-signal importation and pay-cable changed
dramatically. 104
Finally, the Commission acted to exempt small systems with fewer than 1,000
subscribers from all exclusivity and signal-carriage rules.l 0 5 This decision was based
once again on the assumption of minimum injury to broadcasters in the absence of
dispositive contrary evidence. Because these systems comprised over 40 percent of
all systems, this decision reduced substantially the administrative burden on the
Cable Bureau.
Each ruling moved the Commission away from its presumption that the whole
panoply of regulations it had adopted in 1972 was necessary for the protection of
broadcasters. In each case, the FCC invited broadcasters to demonstrate injury
from the prospective liberalization. When they could not, the Commission further
relaxed the regulations. But the only liberalization through 1978 which had a
significant effect upon cable was the relaxation of the leapfrogging restrictions.
The others merely set a pattern for more significant decisions to come.
The most important of these later decisions occurred in connection with a
routine request for waiver of the Commission's "significant viewing" standard.
Under this standard, cable operators were permitted to carry signals from adjacent
markets without counting them against their distant signal quota if they were
independent stations viewed over-the-air by at least 2 percent of the homes in the
market or if they were network affiliates viewed by at least 3 percent of the homes.
However, the Commission had occasionally entertained waivers of these requirements
for cable systems which could show that the carriage of certain of these "inconsistent"
signals would not harm the local broadcasters' ability to serve the public interest
and that there were "unique or anomalous" circumstances involved. An example of
such anomalous circumstances occurred where the Commission had found that
without a waiver the cost of the cable system would be so high that the area would
be denied cable service.' 0 6 In such cases, the Commission balanced the benefits
which would result from granting the waiver against the resulting harm to local
stations in determining whether the waiver should be granted.
102. A discussion of superstation development appears at 107-08, infra.
103. American Broadcasting, Inc., 62 FCC 2d 901 (1977).
104. In this decision, the Commission concluded that cable operators could judge for themselves if the
quality of their offerings from satellite signals received on a 4.5 meter dish was sufficient to attract
consumer interest. If it was not, one would presume that cable operators would not use the 4.5 meter
antenna.
105. Rules and Regulations with Respect to the Definition of a Cable Television System and the
Creation of Classes of Cable Systems, 63 FCC 2d 956 (1977). But see Clearview TV Cable of Enumclaw,
Inc., 68 FCC 2d 1179 (1978).
106. Delta Video, Inc., 41 RAD. REG. (P&F) 2d 706 (1977).
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In ARTEC, 10 7 the cable television system in the Washington, D.C. market
wished to offer cable service in an area in which Master Antenna Television
Services (MATVs) offered Baltimore signals. To forbid ARTEC to carry signals
offered by MATV systems in the same area was obviously a difficult policy to
defend. Therefore, the Commission granted the waiver of the significant-viewing
standard and allowed the importation of the signals.
In its ruling on ARTEC's waiver request, the Commission indicated that while it
had earlier required a showing of anomalous circumstances, henceforth only a
showing of no adverse impact would be required. ARTEC was a potentially
significant decision because it substantially reduced the burden on a cable system in
seeking relief from the Commission's rules. Indeed, in its reconsideration of the
decision, the Commission indicated that after a cable system established a prima
facie case of no adverse impact, the burden of proof shifts to the broadcasters. This
would apparently require that the broadcasters provide data showing that granting
a waiver would endanger their ability to provide service. Moreover, the Commission went so far as to suggest that "...
we would anticipate that prima facie
showings of little or no impact could be made in the larger markets."" ' I Thus, by
1979, the Commission had been moved to argue that the growth of cable facilitated
by the 1972 rules and the waivers granted from them had not placed large-market
stations in peril. It was beginning to recognize that it had overprotected broadcasters.
In 1977, the Commission announced a detailed inquiry into the relationship
between cable television and television broadcasting. Coming only five years after
the adoption of 1972 Cable Rules, this Inquiry could only be a signal that the
Commission had reached a point in reregulation where deregulation might be considered. The principal results of this Inquiry are summarized below, but for the present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that it resulted in the issuance of Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking to drop all distant-signal carriage rules and to eliminate the
syndicated exclusivity rules. The Commission had thus arrived at a position where
it was willing to undo the Consensus Agreement altogether only eight years after
Burch and Whitehead had fashioned it.
K.

Court Interpretations of the Commission's Rules

Two actions taken by the courts were especially important for the development
of cable during this period. The first, and more significant, came when, in Home
Box Office v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the
Commission's pay cable rules.' These rules had sharply limited the ability of cable
systems to offer feature films and sports events on subscription channels in order
to prevent the "siphoning" of programming from broadcasting to cable. In effect,
the Commission was regulating a nonbroadcasting activity, pay cable, in order to
provide protection to broadcasters. Although the court ruled that ".... we think
that the strategy the Commission has employed in implementing its interest in
107.
108.
request
109.

Arlington Telecommunications
69 FCC 2d at 1938-39. Based
which it had previously denied.
Home Box Office v. FCC, 567

Corp. (ARTEC), 65 FCC 2d 469 (1977).
on its decision in ARTEC, the Commission granted a waiver
Tulsa Cable Television, 74 FCC 2d 382 (1979).
F.2d 9 (1977).
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preventing siphoning creates a restriction 'greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest,"' 11 0 it also appeared to say that, in any event, it would not
have affirmed any pay-cable rules because of doubts that the Commission had
jurisdiction to impose them. The court's discussion of Commission jurisdiction
concludes that "(w)ithout further explanation of the function these rules are meant
to serve, we cannot affirm the Commission's authority to promulgate them.""' In
light of this chastisement by the court of appeals, the Commission has not tried to
reimpose pay-cable rules.
A second significant ruling occurred in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.1" 2 In United
States v. Midwest Video Corp.,"13 the Supreme Court had ruled, in a five-to-four
decision, that the FCC had the authority to require cable systems to originate
programming. A plurality of four found that there was no rational distinction
between regulations designed to avoid adverse impact, such as those upheld in
Southwestern Cable, and those whose purpose was to enhance the quality of television service, such as the Commission's origination rules. Indeed, the origination
requirements could be'thought of as imposing on cable systems obligations similar
to those imposed on broadcasters to provide certain kinds of unremunerative
programming.
In Midwest Video H, however, the Commission's rules requiring that channels be
made available by cable operators for access by third parties on a non-discriminatory
basis and that cable systems be required to have a minimum capacity of 20
channels were overturned by the Supreme Court. The majority argued that, while
the origination rules required cable operators only to fulfill a role comparable to
that played by broadcasters, the access rules required them to operate as common
carriers. The Communications Act prohibits the imposition of common carrier
regulation of broadcasters and the majority reasoned that this stricture applied to
cable systems as well. The minority argued that the access requirements should be
sustained since they furthered the statutory objectives. At present, therefore, no
federal rule prohibits the operator of a cable system from controlling access to all
of its channels.
L.

The Copyright Problem Again

The consensus agreement committed all parties (broadcasters, cable operators,
and program suppliers) to support and seek the early passage of copyright
legislation. Under the terms of the agreement, compulsory licenses would be
granted for all signals whose carriage would be authorized under the 1972 rules.
While additional signals might, in the future, be authorized by the Commission, no
compulsory license would be granted for the carriage of such signals. Unless cable
and copyright interests could agree on a fee schedule, the legislation would provide
for compulsory arbitration.

110.
!11.
112.
113.

Id. at 50, citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
567 F.2d 9, 34.
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Midwest Video 11].
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) thereinafter cited as Midwest Video I].
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During the year in which the consensus agreement was being negotiated, a bill
providing for compulsory licensing of distant signal carriage by cable systems was
introduced in the Senate." 4 Where previous proposals for revision of the Copyright Act had called for full copyright liability for the carriage of at least some
signals, this concept was totally absent from S. 644.' 5 The bill specified, for
markets of various sizes, the number of signals for which a compulsory license
would be granted and the fee which would be imposed."16 It also provided a
formula for increasing the fee if the FCC permitted a larger number of signals to
be carried.
7
At about the same time, a second cable copyright case, CBS v. Teleprompter,1
began wending its way through the courts. The Columbia Broadcasting System
attempted to distinguish this case from Fortnightly by arguing that Teleprompter
had employed microwave relays to carry signals over hundreds of miles to its cable
systems while Fortnightly had used nothing more than a strategically placed
antenna. Thus, CBS argued, its copyrights had been infringed by Teleprompter
even if Fortnightly was not liable on the facts of its case. In 1974, on essentially the
same grounds that it had employed in Fortnightly, the Supreme Court ruled that
Teleprompter was not liable for an infringement of copyright.
This set the stage for the enactment of the General Revision of the Copyright
Act in 1976.118 The Revision contained, as had S. 644, a compulsory license
provision but the fee schedule was substantially lower. In addition, while the
consensus agreement had called for a compulsory license only for those signals
authorized by the 1972 cable rules, the General Revision provided for a compulsory license for all signals authorized by the FCC. Unlike S. 644, which provided for
a statutory increase in fees whenever the Commission relaxed its carriage rules, the
General Revision created a Copyright Royalty Tribunal which would be required to
consider adjustments to the fee schedule whenever the carriage rules were changed.
M.

The Economic Inquiry and Its Aftermath

By 1978, the Commission had dropped many of the limitations upon cable
which it had imposed in 1972, and the courts had forced abandonment of others.
The major remaining rules related to distant signals carriage and syndicated
exclusivity, but, a year earlier, the Commission had initiated an Economic Inquiry
directed at examining whether to retain even these rules.' 9 The FCC's Cable
Bureau, aided by a group of academic economists specializing in communications
policy research, reported its findings to the Commission in 1979. This report,

114. S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
115. For a brief history of the legislative proposals concerning copyright through S. 644, see S. M.
Besen, W. G. Manning, & B. M. Mitchell, Copyright Liabilityfor Cable Television: Compulsory Licensing and the
Coase Theorem, 21 J. L. & EcoN., 67, 73-76 (1978).
116. The bill did provide that local broadcast stations would obtain exclusivity as against cable
carriage.
117. CBS v. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
118. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-18 (1976) 17 USCA §§ 1-810 (1977) (effective
Jan. 1, 1978).
119. Notice of Inquiry in Docket 21284, 65 FCC 2d 9 (1977).
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which was adopted by the Commission, concluded that cable provided only a minor
threat to broadcasters' profits and even less to their ability to perform in the public
120
interest. As a result, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
looking toward complete elimination of the broadcast signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules.
The Commission's decision to accept the Economic Inquiy report and to issue the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking marked the first time since 1959 that it had voted
to accept the proposition that television broadcasters did not require protection
from cable to survive, prosper, and serve the public interest. How could it have
reached such a conclusion so much at odds with the policies it had adopted in 1972
or 1966? One possible answer is that broadcasters did not argue very strongly in
favor of continuing the restrictive distant signal rules during the Economic Inquin,.
These rules had been designed to protect large market broadcasters, and cable's
threat to the development of UHF stations had been the asserted rationale for such
a policy. But as the evidence accumulated that cable did not provide much of a
threat to large-market stations, it became increasing difficult to defend this rationale.
The National Association of Broadcasters commissioned a study by Wharton
Economic Forecasting Associates (WEFA) 12 1 which showed a very small impact on
local station audiences as a result of distant signal importation. The Commission's
own study, carried out by Dr. Rolla Edward Park, 12 2 showed a slightly larger, but
still quite small, effect. Table III provides a comparison of the results of two
studies.
Park's results show generally larger effects for somewhat smaller increases in
imported independent signals and lower ultimate cable penetration. For instance,
for a market with three network VHF stations, Park estimates an ultimate cable
penetration of 41 percent of homes in the market when the number of independent signals carried by cable increases from two to six and cable carries three
duplicate network signals. He predicts that this increase will divert 15 percent of
the local audience to the imported stations. The WEFA study estimates that an
increase from one to six independent signals will generate 50 percent ultimate
cable penetration, but a loss of only nine percent of the local stations' audience.
Both the Park and the WEFA studies suggest that the ultimate impact on
audiences of stations located in the top 100 markets from a large increase in
imported distant signals from present levels will be in the six to fifteen percent
range. 123 This loss will only occur when each market is fully wired, a task which will
certainly require the better part of a decade. Thus, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that elimination of the distant signal rules would generate audience losses

120. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Dockets 20988 and 21284, 71 FCC 2d 1004 (1979).
121. Wharton EFA, Inc., The Impacts of Cable TV on Local Station Audience (March 1978)
(Prepared for the National Association of Broadcasters).
122. ROLLA EDWARD PARK, AUDIENCE DIVERSION DUE TO CABLE TELEVISION. A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
NEW DATA Rand Corp. R-2403-FCC (January 1979).
123. The NAB also submitted a study by Charles River Associates, showing a close relationship
between broadcast station revenues and audiences, a conclusion which surprised no one.
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TABLE Ill
ESTIMATES

Local Market
Signals

(2) 2NV-INU
(3) 3NV
(4) 3NV-IIV
3NV-21U
(5) 3NV-31V
3NV-31V-21U

=
=
=
=
=

Loss

FROM

Assumed Ultimate
Cable Penetration

(1) 2NV

NV
NU
IV
IU
(+3N)

OF AUDIENCE

52
52
34
36
52
43
50
39
50
37

INCREASING

IMPORTED

BROADCAST

Increase in Imported
Independent Signals
From
From
From
From
From
From
From
From
From
From

I
2
I
2
I
3
I
2
I
2

to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to

6
5
6
5
6
6 (+3N)
6
6 (+3N)
6
6 (+3N)

SIGNALS

Estimated Loss in
Audience (%)
WEFA
Park
11
12
3
8
9
15

11
13
13
10

network VHF Station
network UHF Station
independent VHF Station
independent UHF Station
plus an additional three imported network signals.

SOURCE: Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 FCC 2d 232 (1979), at 680, 685.

for local broadcast stations of perhaps one to two percent per year over a ten-year
transition in the largest 100 markets. '2 In many markets, partiCularly those with
"grandfathered" cable systems, the loss would be substantially less.

These results are surprisingly consistent with projections made by economists
with more limited data prior to the imposition of the 1972 rules. The Noll-PeckMcGowan study, 12 5 published in 1973, but available as a working paper twt) years
earlier, and Park's 1970 analysis 12 6 offer predictions of the effect of increased
importation of broadcast signals which are very close to those reported by Park in
1979. (See Table IV.) These two earlier studies foresaw a reduction in local
television audience of from 4 to 24 percent as the result of importing four distant
signals into a market of three or more local television signals. Park's 1979 study
estimates audience losses of 8 to 18 percent in the same circumstances. The range
of uncertainty has been narrowed and the optimistic projections tor the impact
upon UHF stations have been tempered, but the forecasts of the effect of cable
signal importations in 1979 were virtually the same as those available to the
Commission in 1971.
Given the central role of local public service programming in the FCC's
broadcast policy, it is surprising how little information exists on the determinants
124. Total audiences of these stations might actually grow to the extent that the growth of population
offsets the effect of audience fragmentation.
125. NOt.L, PECK, & McGowAN, supra note 55, at app. A.
126. PARK, supra note 55.
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF EARLIER STUDIES
OF THE

Local Market Signals

EFFECT

Imported
signals

NV

NU

IV

IU

3
3
3
2

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

4
4
4
4

WITH

PARK'S

1979

ANALYSIS

OF CABLE ON LOCAL-STATION AUDIENCE

Estimated Impact Upon Local Audience (percent)
Park (1970)
Noll-Peck-McGowan
Park (1979)
(1973)
NV
IV
IU
NV
IV
IU
NV
IV
IU
-16
-18
-16
-34

-16
-20

-4
-8*
8
-29

-24
+145*

-8
-11
-11
-22

-18
+10

*Assumes only 3 imported signals.
All estimates are based upon the assumption that ultimate cable penetration will be 90 percent in 3- or
4-station markets and 60 percent in 2-station markets.
SOURCE: R. E.

PARK

(1979).

of the time devoted to such fare. The Economic Inquiry cites only three studies and
concludes that unlimited distant signal importation would reduce it by no more
than five minutes per week per station.127 However, it is clear that, if it wished, the
Commission could offset this miniscule reduction simply by announcing that it
would require greater local programming efforts of its licensees. In any event,
viewers are unlikely to lose much socially-valuable local or informational program2
ming as a result of even a radical change in the FCC's cable policies.1 1
With the battle over pay-cable having been lost in the Home Box Office case, with
new developments such as expanded subscription television, videodiscs and
videocassettes, and direct satellite-to-home broadcasting on the horizon posing
potentially greater threats than cable, and with substantial broadcaster ownership
interests in cable, it is hardly surprising that broadcaster participation in Economic
Inquiry seemed perfunctory. 129 Indeed, the "new" economic evidence provided by
broadcasters varied little from the "old" evidence available to the Commission in
the early 1970s.
N.

Summary

In a very short period, the FCC has marched up and down the hill of cable
television regulation. As this paper is written, the FCC proposes to eliminate the
last vestiges of the federal regulatory shackles imposed upon the cable industry
127. Park, Television Station Performanceand Revenues, EDuC. BROADCASTING REV. (June 1971); Crandall,
Regulation of Television Broadcasting:How Costly is the 'Public Interest'?, REGULArION (Jan/Feb 1978).
128. In a parallel proceeding, completed on the same day as the Economic Inquiry, the Commission
concluded that the effect of its syndicated exclusivity rules was to deny benefits to some members of the
viewing public without any offsetting gains to other viewers. Cable Television Syndicated Exclusivity
Rules, 71 FCC 2d 951 (1979).
129. Interestingly, much of the effort at the Commission appears to have been expended by copyright
interests seeking to resurrect the "retransmission consent" proposal. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Docket 21284, at 68-100.
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during an era of television broadcaster protection. It has, thus, required only
fourteen years for the Commission to retreat almost totally from the most protective of its policies established in 1966. During this period, the regulatory regime
for cable was first "liberalized" through a complex set of rules, which were difficult
to enforce. It then proceeded through a phase of reregulation, designed to lighten
the Commission's administrative burden while providing a glimmer of additional
hope for cable operators. The process of reregulation was substantially accelerated
when the courts failed to uphold the Commission's rules regarding pay-cable and
non-broadcast service requirements.
The combination of court decisions unfavorable to rules restricting cable and
Congressional hostility to the imposition of tight regulatory controls left the FCC in
a strange position. It could continue to regulate cable as a retransmission medium
while the industry evolved into something else. But why should it bother to do so?
As we demonstrate below, the cable industry is changing so rapidly that to continue
the rules limiting broadcast-signal importations may not offer much protection to
broadcasters in the future. More importantly, paving virtually exclusive attention to
whether, and to what extent, broadcasters should be protected had led the
Commission and other policymakers to ignore fundamental issues concerning the
appropriate structure of the cable industry. We turn to these issues in the
concluding Sections of this paper.
lI
CABLE

DURING

I HE

IRANSII ION

The cable system of 1979 was quite different from the community antenna
television system of the 1960s. In 1966, it may have been reasonable for broadcasters
to try to limit cable importation of' distant signals since Without these signals cable
had nothing to offer in areas of good local reception. Few people could have
believed that local access channels were what subscribers wanted. A narcissistic
desire on the part of viewers to see themselves on television was never detected in
any of the empirical studies of cable demand.
If importing distant signals was the sine qua Pno of cable in the 1960s, it was
because pay programming and other nonbroadcast services were not available. For
a scattered population of 3,000 cable systems, program ldistribution was a major
problem. "Bicycling" of videotapes or microwave interconnection of man\, systems
to provide them with programming was simply too expensive, given the small scale
of operation of the average system. Importing broadcast signals by microwave was
not inexpensive, but some nearby stations could be imported, either by private
microwave, by microwave common carriers, or directly from a remote antenna.
There were, however, severe constraints upon such importations since private
microwave networks could not be built to transport a very large number of
independent signals around the country. Instead, cable systems were generally
limited in their choices of broadcast signals to those few which were carried by
specialized common carriers or those from nearby markets.
The 1972 cable rules continued to inhibit large-market cable growth because
the limitations upon imported distant signals were sufficiently severe to make cable
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an unattractive option for most consumers. In 75 percent of the largest 100
markets, cable systems could have offered no more than the local stations plus two
imported signals and they were not free to choose even these. In addition, if the
Commission's syndicated exclusivity rules had been enforced, the attractiveness of a
package cable offer would have been even more limited. Since most markets in the
top fifty already had four or more commercial stations, the importation of only two
additional independents could not be a major inducement to subscribe. Only when
more diverse offerings became available in greater quantity and at a reasonable
cost could these large-market systems hope to have something to offer potential
subscribers.
The rate of growth of total cable subscribers declined modestly throughout the
1966-78 period as the growth opportunities in the smaller markets were exhausted.
(See Table I, above.) It was not until new nonbroadcast services developed that
cable could begin to penetrate the larger markets.
The abandoment of the leapfrogging restrictions, the reversal of the pay-cable
rules, and the Commission's decision to authorize 4.5 meter satellite earth stations
combined to produce a changed environment. In the next few years, satellites
designed specifically to transmit television programming to cable systems were
launched, a wide array of nonbroadcast programming was developed, and at least
four broadcast "superstations" emerged. (See Table V.) At least ten separate pay
cable services were offered by satellite by 1979. Another fourteen or more satellite
services are now available to cable systems under a variety of financing arrangements. These include religious channels, children's channels, public affairs channels, and one which carries the House of Representatives sessions during daytime
hours. (See Table VI.)
TABLE V

1979

SUPERSTATIONS

Southern Satellite Systems/WTBS (Atlanta)
Satellite Communications Systems/KTVU (S.F.)

United Video/WGN (Chicago)
Eastern Microwave/WOR (N.Y.)

Systens

Subscribers

1,710

7.2 million

140

7.600
410

70(,000

2.3 million (1.7 million
on satellite)
2.3 million (400,000
on satellite)

SOURCE: F.C.C. Network Inquiry Special Staff, Video Interconnection: Technolog', Cost and Regulator'

Policies, at 68-73 (March 1980, preliminary).

The importance of these new services to cable operators is drarnatically revealed
by the rate of increase of subscribers since 1976. In both newer and older systems,
the addition of a pay cable service added substantially to basic cable subscriptions.
For systems started before 1970, those adding pay cable services in either 1976 or
1977 experienced an increase in subscribers between 1976 and 1978 which was
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TABLE VI

NONBROADCAST SIGNALS

AVAILABLE TO CABLE SYSTEMS,

1979

Pay Services:
HBO
Showtime
Star Channel
Hollywood Home Theatre/Prism
Optical Systems/Channel 100
Telemation (TPS)
Pay TV Services
Home Theatre Network
CinemericalBestvision
Fanfare

Systems
800
260
17
43
10
56
11
8
37
25

Subscribers
2,000,000
650,000
105,000
167,000
25,000
309,000
35,514
10,000
43,000
7,000

Paid-for-Services
UAlColumbia (3 Services)

300

3,000,000

Other Paid-for-Services and Free Services
Nickelodeon
ESPN
C-SPAN (House of Representatives)
The Movie Channel
Black Entertainment Television
Galavision (Spanish)
Modern Satellite Network
SPN
PTL
CBN
Trinity

-

Children
Sports
Public Affairs
Movies
Minority
Minority
Varied
Varied
Religious
Religious
Religious

SOURCES: SAT Guide (March 1980); FCC, Network Inquiry Special Staff, Recent Trends in Cable
Television Related to the Prospects for New Television Networks, at 53 (January 1980, preliminary).

more than double the rate for those not adding the service. For newer systems, the
effect of pay cable upon subscribers has been even more dramatic, particularly in
1978. The addition of pay cable in these newer systems in 1978 was accompanied by
a growth rate more than triple that of those systems not offering pay services."')
Hence, pay cable

has provided not only a major new source of revenue from

existing customers, but appears to have substantially added to the demand for

cable subscriptions.
Pay cable subscriber growth since 1976 has been dramatic. Between February
1976 and May 1979, the number of cable subscribers also buying one or more pay

cable services increased from 650,000 to 3,300,000.

130. These results were obtained by regression analysis on a randomly drawn sample of 86 older
(pre-1970) and 34 newer cable systems. (Data were obtained from the TELEVISION FACTBOOK, Services
Volume (1977 & 1978 eds.)). The percentage change in subscribers between 1976 and 1978 was
regressed on the percentage change in homes passed by the cable and dummy variables reflecting the
initiation of pay cable service in 1975, 1977, or 1978. For the older systems, pay cable services begun in
1976 and 1977 had a statistically-significant effect upon subscriber growth, but for the newer systems, it
was only the pay services begun in 1978 which significantly affected subscriber growth.
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The development of a myriad of nonbroadcast services has been somewhat
limited by the capacity of the RCA Satcom I satellite. As additional satellites are
launched, more services will be available, making imported broadcast signals even
less valuable. Professional and college sports are turning to satellite for pay cable
distribution. Motion picture companies are increasingly using these satellitedistributed pay services as complements to their first run exhibition strategy,
generally offering films to pay-cable subscribers prior to their exhibition on the
networks. These services, being more specialized than broadcast station offerings
and generally offering no advertising, are likely to be much more attractive than
imported broadcast signals to subscribers.
All of these developments have stimulated interest in franchises in the nation's
major cities. As of April 1980, only nine of the largest thirty markets had cable
systems in their central cities. Franchises have been awarded for cities in six of the
remaining twenty-one, applications are pending in three additional cities, and in
the remaining twelve, the franchising procedure is only beginning.' l In virtually
every major market, however, there is considerable interest in accelerating the
franchising process as the major cable companies and local groups eagerly press
for the right to begin construction of systems offering the rapidly expanding array
of cable services. 132
In summary, the rather dismal projection for the future of cable television
which was prevalent in the late 1960s and early 1970s has been replaced by a "gold
rush" for new franchises. This has occurred because new programming services,
distributed by a new technology, are replacing imported broadcast signals as the
most attractive offering of cable television in the larger markets. Cable television is
no longer the enhancement of local broadcast signals or the importation of nearby
television signals. It is now a service which offers a much wider array of services-an
array which will increase during the 1980s.
IV
THE

ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE

DURING

THE

OF BROADCASTING

TRANSIrION

Given the evolution of cable regulation, it is difficult to establish when the
liberalization of the rules facing cable operator began. The most restrictive policies,
particularly as they affected the largest markets, were probably those in effect
between 1966 and 1972. Cable operators could not import new distant signals into
these markets without an evidentiary hearing or, later, retransmission consent. As a
result, while cable television continued to grow during this period, the growth
occurred largely in the smaller markets. Even after the adoption of the consensus
agreement in 1972, however, the remaining substantial limitation on the number of
signals that could be imported into these markets, the leapfrogging rules which
restricted which signals could be carried, and the pay cable rules combined to limit

131.

The Gold Rush of 1980, BROADCASTING 52-56 (March 31, 1980).

132.

Id.
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cable growth. It was only after the Home Box Office decision in 1977, that large city
cable systems became attractive investments, except in special circumstances.
Cable's difficulty in penetrating large markets is revealed in the FCC's Economic
Inquiry Report. In 1978, 17.1 percent of television households subscribed to cable
television, but in the metropolitan areas of the largest fifty markets, which contain
60 percent of all television households, only 8.3 percent of households were
subscribers,' 33 and 80 percent of these households did not even have access to
cable. 13 4 The effect of the deregulation which occurred through 1978 could hardly
have been substantial in the nation's major markets. 35 But the increase in the
number of cable subscribers, the rapid expansion of satellite-distributed broadcast
signals, and the growth of pay-cable in recent years should have made at least some
impact. Have these impacts been greater than expected? How has the public been
affected by those changes which have occurred? And what can be expected from
further deregulation?
A.

The Impact of Cable Growth on Television Broadcasters

Given the continuing growth of cable in the 1971-79 period, it should be
possible to observe some impact upon television broadcasters. Cable television
fragments local station audiences through its importation of distant signals and its
provisions of originated programming services, but how has this audience loss
affected the revenues or income of local stations?3 "' To answer this question, we
rely on two different sets of data: one for television stations which filed comments
in the FCC's Economic Inquiry, claiming current or prospective damage from
cable, and published FCC data for all markets with three or more stations.
Comments were filed on behalf of seventy-eight stations in the Economic
Inquiry, most alleging actual or potential harnm froin increased cable penetration. 137
Complete data were available for sixty-nine of the stations. The Commission staff
calculated that the income of these stations rose an average of 98 percent between
1972 and 1977 compared with only a 73 percent increase for all stations. Moreover, while the average cable penetration in these markets increased from 24 to 31
percent during this period, the change in penetration is uncorrelated with revenue
growth. Hence, at this very crude level of analysis, it is impossible to detect any
impact of cable penetration growth on station revenues.
The staff also selected the nineteen worst ( ases,3S most of them drawn from
small markets such as Cheyenne (Wyoming), Glendive (Mont.), and Elnira (N.Y.).
Two exceptions are independent UHF stations in Kansas City and Boston.
133. ECONOMIC INQUIRN, REPORT 41-43 (1979).
134. Id.
135. As noted above, the situation appears to be changing with the granting of franchises in a number
of major cities. See BROADCASTING, supra note 131, at 35 (March 31, 1980).
136. Note that some stations may benefit from cable to the extent that the)' are carried by cable into
many other markets. Indeed, a number of so-called "superstations" have developed as the combined
result of the abandonment of the leapfrogging rules and the expansion of satellite service. Moreover,
some studies have shown that UHF stations may benefit from cable since their signals are placed on a
parity with VHF stations.
137. ECONOMIC INQUIRY REPORT 89 (1979 ed.).
138. The "worst" cases were those which evidenced no audience growth, declining real revenues, and
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The Commission's analysis generally concluded that audience diversion due to
cable in these markets has been slight. The few stations suffering more than a 10
percent audience loss are all in the smallest markets. For the seven stations in the
largest 100 markets, the net impact of' cable is estimated to range from a 5.3
percent audience reduction to as much as a 5 percent increase for the UHF
independents. This finding is buttressed by the evidence that between 1972 and
1977, the Boston station's revenues increased by 119 percent and the Kansas City
station enjoyed a 380 percent revenue gain. Thus, the Commission once more was
confronted with evidence that its restrictive cable policies may actually have
harmed rather than nurtured independent UHF stations. In Table VII, there are
as many stations which gained audience as a result of cable as there are audience
losers. On balance, the evidence from those stations which bothered to complain is
that large market stations have essentially been unaffected by cable, but stations in
small markets without three network signals have experienced audience losses on
the order of 10 to 20 percent.
The impact of cable growth upon television industry revenues and profits is not
even discernible from an examination of aggregate data. From 1966 through 1978,
there was more than an eight-fold increase in cable subscribers: from 1.575 million
to 13 million households.S 9 During this period, television industry profits and
in real ternms (see Figure
revenues increased by an average of 4 percent per yearl
by the entire economy,
that
experienced
1), a substantially greater growth rate than
but less than that enjoyed by broadcasters during the 1950s, when television set
penetration was growing rapidly. Since the 1970-71 recession, real television
industry profits and total cable subscribers have been increasing at very nearly the
same rate (approximately 13 percent per annum). In short, the 1970s were a
period of substantial television industry profit growth despite the continuing
increase of cable penetration. Certainly, the FCC could not have viewed the
succession of industry profit reports in the 1972-77 period with much concern as
the process of cable deregulation continued.
Can we even detect an effect of increasing cable penetration upon individual
television markets? In the 123 markets for which the FCC publishes data (those
with three or more stations), there is very little evidence that cable growth has had
a measurable effect upon either revenues or profits. There is very little correlation
between the growth in cable penetration and revenue or income growth since 1972
in these markets. Nor is there any correlation between the change in the growth
rate of profits over the 1972-78 period and the increase in cable penetration. (See
Table VIII.)
Nor is there any discernible pattern when cable penetration increases are
arrayed in discrete increments. (Table IX) Finally, there is no correlation
between changes in the amount of news, public affairs, or local programming and
cable growth. Between 1973 and 1978, the amount of local programming actually
high cable penetration in the 1972-1977 period.

Volume 85a (1980 ed.).

139.

TELEVISION FACTBOOK, Services

140.

FCC, TV Broadcast FinancialData, (annual issues 1966-78).

Annual Revenue
and Profits ($ millions)

Subscribers
(millions)

300

Television Industry Revenues
(1967 $'s)
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FIGURE 1 Cable Subscribers Growth Versus Real Television Industry Revenues and Profits 1966-1978
SOURCE:

F.C.C., The Broadcast Financial Data, TV Digest, Television Factbook
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TABLE VIII
CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN CABLE PENETRATION AND TELEVISION MARKET REVENUES AND PROFITS,

1972-78

(N=

123)

Percent Change in
Cable Penetration:

Percent Change in
Television Market Revenues
Television Market Profits
1972-78
1974-78
1976-78
1972-78*
1974-78**
1976-78

1972-78

-0.1692

0.1264

-0.1184

-0.0929

-0.0129

1974-78

-0.1227

0.0473

-0.0460

-0.0308

0.0205

-0.0558

1976-78

-0.0805

0.1767

-0.0464

-0.0833

0.0416

0.1198

0.1806

0.1806

0.1852

0.1806

Correlation at the
.05 Confidence
Level

0.1806

0.1860

-0.0821

*Excludes seven markets which reported negative profits in 1972.
**Excludes six markets which reported negative profits in 1974.
SOURCE: Calculated from data derived from FCC Television Broadcast Financial Data and American
Research Bureau.

declined in our 123 market sample, but the decline seems to be somewhat greater in
markets with the smallest cable growth. News and public affairs programming
increased by less than 1 percent in the 1973-77 period, but there is no relationship
between changes in this form of "merit- programming and increasing cable
penetration. While a more sophisticated analysis accounting for changes in income,
population, and other demographic variables and distinguishing between basic and
pay cable might reveal some effect of cable penetration on station performance, it
is unlikely to be very large.

TABLE
PERCENTAGE

CHANGES IN

REVENUES,

PROFITS,

INCREASE

Percentage Increase in:

IX

AND "MERIT"

PROGRAMMING

IN CABLE PENETRATION.

FOR

123

MARKETS

RANKED BY

1972-78

Markets with Increase in Cable Penetration
Between 1972 and 1978 of.16% + 11-15% 6-107
0-5%c
Less than 0%

All Markets
(n= 123)

Revenues (1972-78)
Revenues (1974-78)
Revenues (1976-78)

17.3
19.7
14.1

17.8
19.3
13.6

11.6
18.2
12.3

18.8
20.7
13.5

20.4
20.3
17.9

15.8
19.6
13.3

Profits (1972-78)
Profits (1974-78)
Profits (1976-78)

36.6
38.8
16.8

29.0
32.8
13.1

26.3
13.1
12.0

33.1
36.9
18.5

31.7
36.6
23.8

30.4
26.3
15.8

0.7

3.4

0.3

-0.1

2.4

0.8

-0.3

-2.4

-4.7

-2.9

News + Public Affairs
Programming (1973-78)
Local Programming (1973-78)

-1.3

-2.6

SOURCE: Calculated from data derived from FCC Television Broadcast Financial Data and American
Research Bureau.
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Available data on rates of return earned in television provide further corroboration of the thesis that television broadcasters have prospered during the recent
period of deregulation. Assuming that tangible assets represent 80 percent of total
station assets, between 1973 and 1978, the average return on assets (before taxes)
for VHF stations has nearly doubled from 61.3 to 113.8 percent. 14 1 For UHFs, the
increase is even more spectacular. Total UHF profits plus interest payments rose
from only 1.0 percent of net assets in 1973 to 42.8 percent in 1978. The 1978
returns are obviously far above the return required to attract capital to the
industry. Clearly, the scarcity value of a television license continues to be very large
for the average broadcaster.
B.

Summary

The evidence is quite clear: cable retransmission of broadcast signals has not
injured television broadcasters in any noticeable fashion. The effects of cable
growth are not noticeable in revenues, profits, or local programming offerings of
the nation's larger television markets. In the 1970s, television broadcasters' profits
have grown at a very rapid rate as cable television has continued to grow. The
return on television broadcasters' assets is far above the cost of capital. The
number of UHF stations on the air continues to grow, and the UHF broadcasters
are even reporting sizable profits.
While the above evidence suggests that cable growth has not perceptibly injured
broadcasters in the past few years, it is entirely possible that future cable growth
will. Cable television will begin to penetrate the major markets on the basis of a
myriad of new programming services other than broadcast retransmissions. The
future of commercial off-the-air broadcasting is by no means assured, but the basis
for protecting it which formed the foundation of the 1966 and 1972 FCC cable
rules has simply been shown to be invalid.
V
DEREGULATION

AND SOME

UNRESOLVED

ISSUES

It certainly seems possible that, in the near future, the FCC will abandon its
remaining rules restricting cable retransmission of broadcast signals. On the same
day that the Commission adopted the report of the Economic Inquiry it issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking looking toward total deregulation of distant signal
carriage. However, there still remains a possible stumbling block-the issue of
retransmission consent-which, as we have seen, the Commission has been wrestling with for more than two decades. Moreover, even if today there were no
carriage rules, a number of important questions about the future of cable would
remain unresolved, in part the result of the almost exclusive attention given to the
economic impact of cable television on broadcasting in the deliberations over cable
policy.
141. Crandall, Regulation of Television Broadcasting:How Costly is the Public Interest?, RE.
AlOXN
t
(lan./Feb.
1978) provides a discussion of this methodology. The rate of return is measured as (broadcast income
plus interest) divided by (net tangible assets at the end of the year divided by 0.8).
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A. Retransmission Consent Again, and Again, ...
Almost from its earliest consideration of cable, the issue of whether cable
systems should pay for the programs that they retransmit has occupied the
attention of the FCC. There are a variety of views about both the desirability and
practicality of imposing retransmission consent. Some hold that such an arrangement is practical and should be imposed because of its beneficial effects on the
amount and nature of television programming. 142 Others argue that no benefits will
43
result, and that the effect will only be to reduce the services that cable can offer.
Still others argue that such a system is not practical because of the high costs of the
14 4
transactions that would be involved.
The Commission has, variously, suggested that Congress amend the Communications Act to provide for retransmission consent, enacted rules which it argued
were justified, in part, by the absence of such a requirement, and adopted (and
later removed) its own requirement. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court twice ruled
that cable systems were not liable for infringement under the Copyright Act of
1909 when they retransmitted broadcast signals, and Congress enacted a revision
of the Act providing for a compulsory license at statutorily determined fees.
The issue of copyright liability was supposed to have been resolved definitively
by the enactment of the General Revision but the controversy refuses to die. The
National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department
of Commerce has recently urged the Commission to adopt retransmission consent
as part of its deregulation effort,1 4 5 but the Commission has expressed serious
doubts that it has jurisdiction to do so.146 Nonetheless, a number of commissioners
succeeded in having the issue considered as part of the FCC's proposed rulemaking
1
concerning the elimination of its carriage rules. 47
More recently, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, which deals with copyright matters,
was reported to have written to the Chairman of the FCC requesting a delay in
Commission action on deregulation because it "would not only have the effect of
placing enormous burdens on a tribunal not fully prepared to meet them, but
would also precipitate a panicked rush to Capitol Hill for remedial copyright
legislation." 1'4 8 Under the terms of the Copyright Act, a Copyright Royalty Tribunal
must reconsider the "reasonableness" of the compulsory license fee schedule
whenever the Commission changes its carriage rules. Despite this provision, it is
apparently still possible for the chairman of the subcommittee which drafted the
legislation to argue, four years after its passage, that the Tribunal is "not fully

142. See Besen, Manning, and Mitchell, supra note 115. at 68.
143. See, e.g., Chazen and Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Invisible Hand, 83 HARV'. L.
REv. 1820, 1830-41 (1970).
144. See, e.g., M. H. SELDEN, CABLE TELEVISION U.S.A. 112 (1972).
145. Letter from Henry Geller to Charles D. Ferris and Petition for Rulemaking (February 14, 1979).
146. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 FCC 2d 1004, at 1036-42 (1979).
147. Id. at 1035.
148. BROADCASTING, at 25 (March 24, 1980).
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prepared"' 4 9 to deal with such matters and that Commission action would trigger
150
not a change in the fee schedule but "a panicked rush to Capitol Hill.'
It is thus a reasonable prediction that the issues of copyright liability and
retransmission consent will be around for some time to come, and that the manner
in which the problem had previously been resolved will make the achievement of
total deregulation a more difficult task. 15 ' Moreover, one effect of deregulation
would almost certainly be to intensify the difficulties faced by the Copyright
52
Royalty Tribunal, which would become the focus of the debate over cable policy.1
B.

Access

A number of commentators have argued that it is critical, given the potentially
large channel capacity of a cable system, that limitations be placed on the number
of channels that the cable operator can program, and that provision be made for
guaranteed nondiscriminatory access by others. 53 Indeed, the three major bodies
which examined cable policy in the early 1970s all recommended some form of
"common carrier" status for cable. The Sloan Commission on Cable Communications recommended that the cable system owner be allowed to operate only two
channels and that other channels be mandated for particular uses or made
available for leasing on a nondiscriminatory basis. 15 4 The Committee for Economic
Development argued that cable owners should be allowed to originate or control
programming on a limited number of channels, but should be required to demon55
strate affirmatively that they are not restricting the competitive access of others.
And a committee of cabinet officers recommended that cable operators should be
required to offer their channels for lease to others on a nondiscriminatory basis
except for channels used for retransmission of broadcast signals and one or two
channels reserved for use of the operator. 15 6 The rationale for these recommendations is that it would be undesirable for the operator to control many channels in a
medium which is generally recognized to be a natural monopoly.
In its 1972 rules the FCC did make provision for some channels which the cable
operator would be required to lease on a nondiscriminatory basis in addition to
three channels reserved for free access for specific uses. However, even this limited
form of common carrier access was struck down in Midwest Video I. Thus, without

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. One proposal for an omnibus revision of the Communications Act would have resolved the issue
by imposing a retransmission consent requirement. H. R. 3333, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., § 453 (a)(2) (1979).
It appears, however, that passage of this or similar legislation is unlikely any time soon.
152. At this writing, the Tribunal is engaged in two proceedings, one which is concerned with the
distribution of royalty fees and another which is responsive to a statutory requirement that the fee
schedule be examined for reasonableness in 1980.
153. For an early statement see Owen, Public Policy and Emerging Technology in the Media, 18 PuB. POL'V
(1970).
154. SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE-TuI TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE
141-44 (1971).
155. COMM. FOR ECON. DEVELOPIENT BROADCAsTING AND CABI.ETEILEVISION-PoiLI(I FS FOR DI VERSITY AND
CHANCE 70 (April 1975).
156. CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COM\IMUNICATION, CABLE-REP'oRT I 10 1I1 PRESIDENT (1974).
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Thus, without federal legislation, the future of cable will be one in which cable
operators will control many channels and with no requirement that access be
granted to others unless such requirements are imposed by local franchising
authorities. So long as cable reaches a relatively small number of households, this
may not be a matter of great concern, but imposition of access requirements on a
mature cable industry is likely to meet considerable resistance. While local franchising
authorities appear to be concerned with having the cable operator provide free or
low-cost access to local citizens and public bodies, they seldom require the operator
to make available a substantial number of channels on a nondiscriminatory, paid
access basis. This issue is likely to become especially important if large numbers of
cable programmers are denied access to cable systems. At this time, however, there
appears to be little interest in the issue of access.
C.

Ownership

Access is not the only issue that has received only limited attention in the
debates over the regulation of cable. In the 1960s, the FCC did invite comments on
the question of whether limitations should be placed on who could own cable
systems, the number of cable systems that could be owned, or the number of
subscribers who could be served by any one entity. 157 But despite the fact that the
Commission adopted rules banning television networks from owning cable systems, 158 broadcaster ownership of cable systems in the same market, 15 ' and telephone company operation of cable systems,161 it is fair to say that the Commission
has not recently exhibited much interest in these questions.
This lack of interest is indicated by the treatment accorded to a number of
recent mergers and joint ventures. The proposed merger between General Electric
and Cox Broadcasting has apparently come under scrutiny only in connection with
the broadcast properties owned by the merging partners. The fact that both parties
have substantial cable interests, and that the merger would create the third largest
cable system operator seems not to have attracted much attention. Similarly, the
purchase by Time, the parent of the dominant pay cable programmer, Home Box
Office, of American Television and Communications, a major multiple system
owner, seemed to receive only perfunctory consideration by both the Department
of Justice and the FCC. And, Showtime, a joint pay-cable programming venture
between Viacom and Teleprompter, two major system operators, was treated
similarly.
The point here is not necessarily that these developments are undesirable,
although one might argue, for example, that mergers mav reduce the number of
157. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC 417 (1968).
158. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 23 FCC 2d 816, 822 (1970).
159. Id.
160. 18 RAn. REG. (P&F) 2d 1549; reconsid denied 18 RAn. Rh,;. (P&F) 2d 1798. The Commission's
restriction on telephone company operation of cable systems is presumably based on the premise that
cable may provide an alternative distribution system for non-entertainmen services. If, however, cable
proves simply to be an alternative distribution mechanism for television programs, the basis for this
restriction may be eroded.

Page 77: Winter 1981]

CAB.FE TEL.EVISION

potential bidders for cable franchises. What is important is that, as compared to the
attention lavished on the issues of distant signal importation, audience fragmentation, and program siphoning, the resources devoted to consideration of the
appropriate structure of the cable industry seem woefully inadequate. Serious
analysis of the effects of horizontal concentration and vertical integration has been
virtually nonexistent, and these issues still seem at the periphery of the concerns of
the Commission. Once again, the attention given to the question of economic
injury may have diverted resources from the consideration of questions which may
be far more significant in the long run.
D.

Local Franchising

The 1980s will undoubtedly witness a shift of cable regulation from the federal
government to the states and localities. In the process, attention will shift from
limitations on the services that cable systems can offer to their subscribers to the
regulation of subscriber rates and the imposition of service requirements by local
franchising authorities. At present, there are hotly-contested franchise battles
taking place in many of the major cities with the competitions being judged on the
technical characteristics of the systems, the fees to be charged, and, especially, the
services, including access channels, to be offered.
With the rewards to a successful franchise application being potentially very
large, there is a growing tendency for applicants to offer very extensive packages
of services. It seems clear that many of the services being proposed are designed as
much to attract the attention of the franchising authorities as that of the public.
Many will, therefore, likely prove to be unprofitable and local franchising authorities may be faced with having either to accept a reduction in services as cable
systems seek to suspend these unremunerative offerings or to permit an increase in
the rates that are charged for profitable services.
A related problem arises in connection with the services that are known to be
unremunerative at the time of the franchise award. These services-which are
either imposed by the franchising agency or proposed by the cable systemsometimes include free "basic" service, i.e., no charge is imposed if the household
takes only retransmitted broadcast signals, and usually include free access channels,
so that local governments, educational institutions, and members of the public can
transmit programs at no charge. Franchise applicants accept a requirement or
propose to provide these services because they believe that to do so enhances their
prospects for being awarded the franchise. These services are likely to be especially
vulnerable, therefore, if the overall package of services which the applicant has
agreed to provide proves to be less profitable than expected. The franchising
agency will then be faced with either permitting these services to be eliminated or
allowing the imposition of a charge for basic service, or raising the rates on other
services. In short, the act of granting the cable franchise should be regarded as the
16 1
beginning and not the end of the process of local cable regulation.
161.

For a useful discussion of the difficulties facing a local franchising agency, see Williamson,
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VI
CONCLUSION

In less than twenty years, the FCC has argued that no regulation of this new
industry is required, then regulated the industry in such a manner as to preclude
its development in any but the smallest television markets, and, finally, appears to
be moving to almost total deregulation of the industry. This pattern of increasing
regulation followed by deregulation is much more rapid than the recent experience
in transportation, energy, or financial markets.
In part, the pace of deregulation of cable television has been driven by the
rapid changes in the industry created by the technological revolution in communications. The development of satellite distribution and the continuing decline in even
the nominal costs of this new technology during a period of accelerating inflation
has transformed cable from a mere retransmission medium to an independent
source of television programming. If the copyright issue were reopened and the
FCC failed to change its broadcast-signal carriage rules, it is entirely conceivable
that cable television could and would prosper in the 1980s without broadcast
signals. But without such signals, the FCC's authority for regulating cable would
virtually disappear, as the Home Box Office case demonstrated. Congress has
steadfastly shown little interest in extending the FCC's jurisdiction to what is
essentially a new industry-or at least a very different industry from the community antenna television industry of the 1960s.
As the industry was changing, evidence accumulated that the FCC rationale for
regulating cable was flawed. Earlier academic studies had suggested that the
development of cable would not cripple traditional television broadcasting through
its retransmission of broadcast signals. Nor would it lessen the stations' ability to
offer local programming. More than a decade has provided substantial evidence to
corroborate these findings. The Commission is thus left without a rationale for
continuing the detailed supervision of a new industry which has developed to
compete with the regulated sector-television broadcasting. The evidence is clear
that competition will not erode the ability of the FCC to require the crosssubsidization of programming which it finds to be in "the public interest." This
situation contrasts with the current status of common carriage trucking, for
example, where there is still concern for the cross-subsidization of small communities by regulated common carrier trucks. Rather, the evidence for cable television is
more like that available in 1978 for the airline industry which demonstrated that
cross-subsidization was not required to keep commuter services alive at numerous
small airports throughout the country. For this reason, cable television deregulation
has proceeded as rapidly as airline deregulation once the evidence was accumulated.
Despite the absence of any evidence that regulation was needed to protect
television broadcasters from cable retransmission of their signals, one might still
have expected deregulation to be resisted. In fact, some resistance remains,
particularly among large-market broadcasters. But it appears that heading off the
competitive threat from cable retransmissions is simply not a battle worth waging.
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The home entertainment-information market is changing so rapidly that broadcasters,
networks, film distributors, and others involved in the entertainment sector are
scrambling to position themselves to profit from the new technological developments. Satellite distribution of signals directly to the home, the myriad of pay
services possible through satellite distribution, STV, MDS, videodiscs, videocassettes,
or traditional cable television are so enticing that protection of local broadcasters is
no longer compelling (except to some of the owners of broadcast licenses).
The sad lesson to be learned from this experience in deregulation then, is that
regulation can be dismantled-even its cartel-like strain-when it no longer
matters. The retransmission of television broadcast signals is rapidly fading as an
issue, joining the setting of canal rates and telegraph tariffs in an obscure niche of
the history of regulation.
VII
EPILOGUE

On July 22, 1980, less than three months after this paper was originally
delivered, the Federal Communications Commission eliminated its remaining distant signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules.' 6 2 In adopting this policy the
Commission stated: "Based on the wealth of information and analysis now before
us, we believe the rule changes proposed should be adopted and that this will
significantly benefit the public with no undue risk of injury to the broadcast service
the public now receives."'1 63 In summarizing the evidence on the impact of deleting
its signal carriage rules, the Commission indicated that "the relaxation of our
distant signal carriage restrictions will promote substantial improvements in television service to the public without causing any signficant risk of loss of the existing
levels of service provided by local television broadcast stations. We have found ...
that competition from cable television has improved television service to the public
and will continue to do so in the future."' 6 4 Relying on evidence that indicated little
or no harm to broadcasters from elimination of the syndicated exclusivity rules and
on the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act the Commission concluded that, "These
rules serve no valid communications policy purpose. On the other hand, we believe
that the syndicated exclusivity rules impose significant costs upon the subscribers
and potential subscribers of cable television. Therefore ...
we conclude that the
public will be served better without the syndicated exclusivity rules for cable
television systems."'65
Assuming that the Commission does not reconsider its actions and that they are
upheld by the courts, 1 6 6 the era of FCC regulation of cable television programming

162. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules and Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 79 FCC 2d 652 (1980).
163. Id. at paragraph 4.
164. Id. at paragraph 191.
165. Id. at paragraph 242-243.
166. An appeal has already been filed, Paul Harris. Postcripts to FCC Scrapping of Two Key Cable
TV Rules, Variety 47 (July 30, 1980).
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service is now over. The Coypright Royalty Tribunal, the Congress, and state and
local regulatory agencies now become the focal points for future policy deliberations and these deliberations will likely be concerned with industry structure,
royalty fees, access to cable, and subscriber fees, rather than with the kinds of
services cable systems are permitted to of fer.

